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Whoever, unaware, comes close and hears the Sirens' [lucid song] will
nevermore draw near... his home .... But if you wish to listen to their
song, just stand erect before the mast and ... tie fast your hands and feet
..... But... if you plead with [your crew] to loose those bonds, they
must add still more ropes and knots.1
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most remarkable aspects of the Constitution is the
manner in which it marbles together people and states. The Constitu-
tion begins with the words "We the People of the United States' 2 and
ends with requirements for state ratification and the signatures of its
authors.3 In between, the Constitution alternately protects or subjects
to national control people and states.4 While "American federalism
allowed the federal government to do almost all its business directly
1 THE ODYSSEY OF HOMER 244 (Allen Mandelbaum trans., 1990).
2 U.S. CONST. pmbl. "The Constitution of the United States was ordained and established,
not by the states in their sovereign capacities, but emphatically... by 'the People of the United
States."' Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 324 (1816).
In his 1865 commentary, O.A. Brownson asked,
Who are this people? ... Are they the people of the States severally? No; for they call
themselves the people of the United States. Are they a national people, really existing
outside and independently of their organization into distinct and mutually independent
States? No; for they define themselves to the people of the United States. If they had
considered themselves existing as States only, they would have said "We, the States," and if
independently of State organization, they would have said "We, the people," do ordain, &c.
THE AMERICAN REPUBLC: ITS CONSTTUTION, TENDENCIES, AND DESTiNY 220-21 (1865).
3 U.S. CONST. art. VII. Compare McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403
(1819) (rejecting the argument that the Constitution emanated from the states: "when [the peo-
ple] act, they act in their states. But the measures they adopt do not, on that account, cease to be
the measures of the people themselves or become the measures of state governments.") with
U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842,1875 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S.
CONST. art. VII) (While "[t]he Constitution took effect once it had been ratified by the people
gathered in convention in nine different states," it "went into effect only 'between the States so
ratifying the same."').
4 I have discussed this structure in Jay S. Bybee, Taking Liberties with the First Amendment:
Congress, Section S and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1539, 1546-52
(1995).
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with persons,"' the states remained "constituent and essential parts of
the federal Government."'6
By ratifying the Constitution, the states agreed to cede a portion
of their sovereignty to a new entity, the "United States." The states
granted to Congress their collective powers to impose taxes,7 incur
debt,8 issue coin and securities, 9 regulate commerce among the states
and with other sovereigns, 10 and control the engines of war." The
states further relinquished their rights to act as independent sover-
eigns and enter into treaties with foreign countries, coin money, grant
titles of nobility, and wage war.'2 The states gave up their powers to
lay duties on the goods of other states,13 to treat citizens of other
states as aliens who lack the privileges and immunities of their own
citizens, 14 and to regard the public acts of other states as those of for-
eign powers.15 As to those powers vested in Congress and deprived
the states, Congress's authority was complete over people and states.
Nevertheless, Congress did not acquire the plenary powers of a
national government. Madison noted that if "the Government [is] na-
tional with regard to the operation of its powers, it changes its aspect
again when we contemplate it in relation to the extent of its powers.' 16
The states reserved authority over their criminal laws,17 particularly
the power to issue or not the Writ of Habeas Corpus.' 8 The Constitu-
tion also made clear that states might maintain a separate militia' 9 and
provide their own rules regarding religious freedom, speech, and
5 William H. Riker, The Senate and American Federalism, 49 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 452, 453
(1955).
6 THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 311 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
7 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
8 Id. § 8, cl. 2.
9 Id. § 8, cls. 5, 6.
10 Id. § 8, cl. 3.
11 The Constitution accomplished this by affirmatively granting such powers to Congress and
expressly disabling the states from exercising such powers. Id. § 8, cls. 11-16; § 10; see Barron v.
Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 249 (1833).
12 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cls. 1, 3.
13 Id. § 8, cl. 2.
14 Id art. IV, § 2; see Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1869).
15 U.S. Co~sT. art. IV, § 1.
16 THE FEDERAUST No. 39, at 256 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (emphasis in
original).
17 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4; see Jay S. Bybee, Insuring Domestic Tranquility: Lopez, Federali-
zation of Crime, and the Forgotten Role of the Domestic Violence Clause (unpublished manu-
script, on file with Northwestern University Law Review).
18 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; see Jordan Steiker, Incorporating the Suspension Clause: Is
There a Constitutional Right to Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners?, 92 MICH. L. REv.
862, 871-72 & n.42 (1994).
19 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16; amend. II.
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press. 20 States retained a right to territorial integrity against efforts to
divide or combine states21 and the right not to be deprived of equal
representation in the Senate without the state's consent 22 To these
enumerated reservations, the Constitution added that powers not del-
egated to the United States, nor prohibited to the states, were re-
served to the states and the people.23
Nowhere is the interrelationship between the people who or-
dained and established the United States and the states who ratified it
more evident than in the election of the President and the composi-
tion of Congress. The President and Vice President are selected by
the electors who meet following popular election. By tradition, a
state's electors-equal to the total of its senators and representatives
in Congress-vote for the candidate who received the largest number
of votes in the state.24 The voting for President is accomplished by
states. This arrangement combined both democracy and federalism,
without subordinating one to the other.25
This same pattern replicated in the structure of Congress. As
James Madison described it:
20 U.S. CONST. amend. I; Bybee, supra note 4, at 1557-60; see U.S. CONsT. art. I. § 8, cl. 8; art.
III, § 3, cl. 1; William T. Mayton, Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee ofa Freedom of Expres-
sion, 84 COLUM. L REV. 91, 115-16, 118 (1984) (arguing that the omission in Treason Clause to
constructive treason barred seditious libel and that the Copyright Clause limits Congress's power
to suppress freedom of press).
21 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
22 Id art. V.
23 Id. amend. X. The people, without regard to their political incorporation as states, re-
served their own rights against the national government and the states. For example, people
may not be deprived by the national government of the right to Habeas Corpus, id. art. I, § 9, cl.
2, nor may they suffer bill of attainder or ex post facto laws, id. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. The Bill of Rights
specifies other rights that inure to "Owner," id. amend. III; "people," id. amend. IV; "person,"
id. amend. V; or "accused," id. amend. VI. Similarly, states are forbidden from enacting bills of
attainder, ex post facto laws, or laws impairing the obligation of contracts. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
My discussion here has been limited to those guarantees in the Constitution of 1789 and the Bill
of Rights.
24 Id. amend. XII; see also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, REFORM AND COrNrNurry: THE ELEC-
TORAL COLLEGE, THE CONVENTION, AND THE PARTY SYSTEM 5 (1971).
25 As Professor Diamond explained,
Elections are as freely and democratically contested as elections can be-but in the states.
Victory always goes democratically to the winner of the raw popular vote-but in the
states ... Democracy thus is not the question regarding the Electoral College, federalism is:
should our presidential elections remain in part federally democratic, or should we make
them completely nationally democratic?
MARTIN DIAMOND, THE ELECTORAL COLLEOE AND THE AMERICAN IDEA OF DEMOCRACY 7
(1977) (emphasis in original); see Martin Diamond, The Federalist on Federalism: "Neither a
National Nor a Federal Constitution, But a Composition of Both," 86 YALE L.J. 1273, 1283-85
(1977) [hereinafter Diamond, The Federalist on Federalism]; see also U.S. Term Limits v. Thor-
ton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1875 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The ultimate source of the Constitu-
tion's authority is the consent of the people of each individual State, not the consent of the
undifferentiated people of the Nation as a whole.").
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The house of representatives will derive its powers from the people of
America, and the people will be represented in the same proportion, and
on the same principle, as they are in the Legislature of a particular State.
So far the Government is national not federal. The Senate on the other
hand will derive its powers from the States, as political and co-equal so-
cieties; and these will be represented on the principle of equality in the
Senate, as they now are in the existing Congress. So far the government
is federal, not nationaL26
Federalism and democracy are not in opposition in Congress any
more than they are in the Electoral College; they work in concert to
hold the relationships among the national government, the states, and
the people in constitutional equipoise. Neither is federalism a com-
petitor to democracy, but its willing servant. Federalism suggests to
the democratic impulse that it should confine itself to local rather than
to national resolution; that uniformity of government is not required
and may, therefore, not be demanded. Thus, federalism is a different
manifestation of democratic will: Democracy demands that individual
voices be heard; federalism asks, "How great the din?"
The mechanism by which the states could most readily defend
against federal encroachment was their representation in the Senate.
"[T]he equal vote allowed to each state, is at once a constitutional
recognition of the portion of sovereignty remaining in the individual
states, and the instrument for preserving that residuary sovereignty. " 27
State legislatures stood to mediate between the national government
and the people, both for the state's account and the account of the
people. As Alexander Hamilton said,
[T]he state Legislature, who will always be not only vigilant but suspi-
cious and jealous guardians of the rights of the citizens, against en-
croachments from the Federal government, will constantly have their
attention awake to the conduct of the national rulers and will be ready
enough, if any thing improper appears, to sound the alarm to the people
and not only to be the VOICE but if necessary the ARM of their
discontent.2 8
Accordingly, the Constitution entrusted to state legislatures the duty
to elect the state's senators. 29
Ironically, in 1913 the states dealt away their most potent tool-
most willingly and in near record time-by ratifying the Seventeenth
26 THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 254-55 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961); see also
THE FEDERALIST No. 58, at 392 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) ("[P]eculiarity [in
the Constitution] lies in this, that one branch of the legislature is a representation of citizens; the
other of the states.").
27 Tim FEDERALIST No. 62, at 417 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
28 THE FEDERALIST No. 26, at 169 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
29 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 ("The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislatures thereof."), repealed by U.S. CoNsT. amend.
XVII.
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Amendment.30 During the debates over the proposed amendment,
Elihu Root, New York Senator, former Secretary of State and War,
and future Nobel Peace Prize winner, recognized the folly of this act.
He said that in the original mode of selecting senators the people were
as Ulysses, heroically bound to the mast that "he might not yield to
the song of the siren .... [S]o the American democracy has bound
itself... and made it practically impossible that the impulse, the prej-
udice, the excitement, the frenzy of the moment shall carry our de-
mocracy into those excesses which have wrecked all our prototypes in
history.131 Just as the Goddess Circe had warned Ulysses, "no one,"
Root argued, "can foresee the far-reaching effect of changing the lan-
guage of the Constitution in any manner which affects the relations of
the States to the General Government. How little we know what any
amendment would produce!" 32
Yet, unbind themselves the states did. How could the states have
been so foolhardy as to disenfranchise themselves? Why would the
state legislatures surrender their most important constitutional func-
tion? Senator Root correctly surmised that when the states unbound
themselves from the mast, they had little idea of the consequences of
the amendment. In the eighty-three years since the states ratified the
Seventeenth Amendment, they have willingly, though ignorantly, ac-
cepted the consequences of direct election. This article is an attempt
to assess those consequences.
Part II discusses the original structure of the U.S. Senate and the
constitutional architecture the Founders erected. There is a natural
tension between the Senate's role as an independent, detached body
in Congress and its duty to represent the states, and that tension runs
through the debates over its formation. Part II also discusses the
Founders' assumptions about the nature of senatorial election, repre-
sentation and tenure, and importantly, those mechanisms for ensuring
accountability in the Senate that were familiar to the Founders but
that they chose not to make formal in the Constitution. These mecha-
nisms, including instruction, recall, and rotation in office, might have
insured greater state control over the Senate; their absence contrib-
uted to making state legislatures irrelevant to the process of selecting
senators.
Part III reviews the debates over the Seventeenth Amendment,
the stated reasons for its passage, and more modern views of the inter-
ests satisfied in its passage. The framers of the Amendment focused
superficially on corruption in state legislatures and delay in electing
senators, and ignored the effects direct election promised to bring to
30 "The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State,
elected by the people thereof ... ." U.S. CoNsr. amend. XVII.
31 46 CONo. REa 2241 (1911).
32 46 CONG. REa 2242 (1911).
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state representation in the Senate. While proponents of the Amend-
ment expressed great confidence in the judgment of the people as
electors, they manifested no concern for the future of the states and
the severing of important ties between the Senate and state legisla-
tures. They also failed to see that popular election alone relieved sen-
ators of any real accountability to their new constituency.
Despite the structural nature of the Seventeenth Amendment, it
has occasioned surprisingly little scholarly commentary. There was al-
most no contemporaneous legal commentary,33 and only recently has
the legal community begun to explore the effect the Seventeenth
Amendment has had on the American political and legal system.34 In
Part IV, I examine the effects of the direct election of senators. It had
an immediate, measurable effect on the political composition in the
Senate and likely had long-term effects on the political composition of
33 The principal contemporaneous work was GEORGE HAYNES, THm ELECTION OF SENA-
TORS (1906) [hereinafter G. HAYNES, ELECTION OF SENATORS]. See Max Farrand, Popular Elec-
tion of Senators, 2 YALE REV. 234 (1913) (asserting that Seventeenth Amendment is matter of
policy; not contrary to original purposes); Joseph R. Long, Tinkering with the Constitution, 24
YALE L.J. 573, 587-88 (1915) (discussing ease of passage of Sixteenth and Seventeenth Amend-
ments; opposing making it easier to amend the Constitution); Gordon E. Sherman, The Recent
Constitutional Amendments, 23 YALE L.J. 129 (1913) (discussing the process by which the Seven-
teenth Amendment was adopted); Note, Devices for Securing in Substance Direct Election of
United States Senators, 24 HARV. L. REv. 50 (1910) (discussing advisory primary elections as a
substitute for direct election); see also Edward P. Buford, Federal Encroachments upon State
Sovereignty, 8 CONST. REV. 23, 37 (1924) (arguing that Seventeenth Amendment threatens state
sovereignty).
34 C.H. HOEBEKE, THE ROAD TO MASS DEMOCRACY: ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE SEVEN-
TEENTH AMENDMENT (1995) (suggesting that the Seventeenth Amendment has not fulfilled its
promise); Vikram David Amar, Indirect Effects of Direct Election: A Structural Examination of
the Seventeenth Amendment, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1347 (1996) (arguing that the Seventeenth
Amendment affected separation of powers); Laura E. Little, An Excursion into the Uncharted
Waters of the Seventeenth Amendment, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 629 (1991) (discussing the process for
filling senatorial vacancies in light of Seventeenth Amendment); Todd J. Zywicki, Senators and
Special Interest: A Public Choice Analysis of the Seventeenth Amendment, 73 OR. L. REv. 1007
(1994) (discussing state and constituent self-interests in seeking or opposing the Seventeenth
Amendment); Roger G. Brooks, Comment, Garcia, The Seventeenth Amendment, and the Role
of the Supreme Court in Defending Federalism, 10 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 189 (1987) (discuss-
ing the Seventeenth Amendment's "crippling" effect on federalism); Kris W. Kobach, Note, Re-
thinking Article V: Term Limits and the Seventeenth and Nineteenth Amendments, 103 YALE L.J.
1971 (1994) (discussing the process of enacting the Seventeenth Amendment and its informal
effect on Article V); Byron Daynes, The Impact of the Direct Election of Senators on the Polit-
ical System (1971) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago) [hereinafter Daynes,
Direct Election] (discussing the unintended consequences of the Seventeenth Amendment and
suggesting that it has not achieved its purposes); see also Riker, supra note 5 (discussing the
effects of the Seventeenth Amendment on federalism; noting the amendment's inevitability);
Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composi-
tion and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543 (1954) (noting, but failing
to give any significance to, the Seventeenth Amendment).
I only became aware of Professor Amar's article as this article was going to press. I regret
that I could not give it greater consideration.
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state legislatures as well. It has made the Senate less responsive to the
states and the people, contributed to longer Senate terms, and
changed the calculus of the Senate's constitutional functions. I con-
clude that the actual effect of the Amendment has been greatly under-
stated and that its role in reducing the constitutional position of the
states has been enormous. Almost inadvertently, the Seventeenth
Amendment altered constitutional politics, further insulating states
from sharing in the control of the government they united to create.
II. "MORE COOLNFSS": 35 THE STRUCTUmN OF THE U.S. SENATE
A. Pre-Constitutional Senates
In the colonial period of American history, eleven of the thirteen
original states had bicameral legislatures. The lower houses, known as
the assembly, burgess, commons, representatives, or delegates, were
patterned after the House of Commons and were popularly elected.
The upper house, known as the council, resembled the House of
Lords and was selected by the king in the royal colonies and the pro-
prietor in the proprietary colonies. In the three popular colonies, the
councillors were selected by the general legislature (Massachusetts) or
the voters (Connecticut and Rhode Island).3 6 Pre-revolutionary coun-
cils comprised "provincial aristocracy" and served in defense of royal
authority.37 Although many councillors were large landholders, most
did not derive their principal income from land, and even fewer actu-
ally farmed; they represented "predominantly urban rather than ru-
ral" interests.3 8
Following the colonies' declaration of independence in 1776, co-
lonial councils were renamed "senates" in early state constitutions.
These early senates remained the stronghold of the aristocratic class-
"to avoid 'the tumult and riot incident to a simple Democracy"' 39-
but democratic elements crept in. Although state senators served
longer terms than their counterparts in the lower houses, they failed
to secure permanent seats. "[D]espite... attempts to dilute or... to
refine the democratic influence, the great majority of senators were
chosen for short terms by small property holders. '40
35 1 THm RECORDS OF TFE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 151 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)
[hereinafter 1 FARRAND] (statement of James Madison).
36 CLARA H. KERR, Tim Ortona AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 2
(1895); JACKSON T. MAIN, Tnm UPPER HOUSE IN REVOLUTONARY AMERICA, 1763-1788, at 3
(1967).
37 MAIN, supra note 36, at 232.
38 id. at 94-95.
39 Frances Harrold, The Upper House in Jeffersonian Political Theory, VA. MAO. HIST. &
BIOGRAPHY 281, 281 (July 1970) (quoting Carter Braxton; citation omitted), reprinted in 1 THm
CONGRESS OF THE UNrED STATES, 1789-1989, at 235 (Joel Sibley ed., 1991).
40 MAIN, supra note 36, at 189, 235-36.
91:500 (1997)
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The Articles of Confederation departed from the bicameral sys-
tem embraced by the states. Delegates to the unicameral Congress
were to be "appointed in such manner as the legislature of each state
shall direct,.., with a power reserved to each state to recal[l] its dele-
gates."'41 Additionally, states paid their own delegations and no dele-
gate served for "more than three years in any term of six years." 42
The real debate was whether Congress represented states or people;
large states naturally favored state representation in proportion to
population, while smaller states argued that sovereign states must be
represented equally. Ultimately, each state was granted one vote,
although important questions, such as waging war and borrowing
money, required the assent of nine states.43 The state legislatures,
given the power to decide the manner of appointing representatives to
Congress, generally exercised that power in favor of themselves. Only
two states-Connecticut and Rhode Island, both with histories of pop-
ular selection of senators-permitted the voters to elect their dele-
gates."4 Except in these two states, delegates looked to state
legislatures for their appointments, and in all states they were be-
holden to state legislatures for their salaries and, because legislatures
held the power to recall them, their continued appointment. Indeed,
the only inroad on state control of members of Congress was the ten-
ure limitation, which was the familiar colonial practice of rotation in
office.45 The structure of the Articles of Confederation emphasized
that the delegations represented states (and their people) and not the
people at large (and their united states).
B. The Creation of the Senate
The Constitutional Convention of 1787 faced the same questions
of representation as the Congress that agreed to the Articles of Con-
federation. Under the New Jersey Plan, Congress would have re-
mained a single branch in which states would be represented equally;
under the Virginia Plan, Congress would become a bicameral legisla-
ture, selected by the people.4 6 Once the convention determined to
have a bicameral legislature, it provided for a House of Representa-
tives, chosen "by the people immediately, as a clear principle of free
[government]."' 47 The convention then turned to the "second branch"
41 ART. CONFED. art. V, § 1.
42 Id. § 2.
43 Id. § 4; art. IX, § 6; see MERRILL JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 141-45
(1940).
44 I WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY, POLITICs AND THE CONSrUlION 525-26 (1953).
45 See infra text accompanying notes 193-230.
46 CATHERINE D. BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPFIA 104-06 (1966).
47 1 FARRAND, supra note 35, at 134 (statement of James Madison).
HeinOnline -- 91 Nw. U. L. Rev.  508 1996-1997
Consequences of the Seventeenth Amendment
and to the difficult questions of mode of election, tenure, and state
representation.4 8
Throughout the debates over the Senate, two themes recurred.
First, the Senate should counter the democratic excesses of the peo-
ple, newly represented in the House of Representatives. In Madison's
words, the Senate must be structured to reflect "more coolness"'49 of
decision and to "render [the houses of the legislature] by different
modes of election, and different principles of action, as little con-
nected with each other, as the nature of their common functions, and
their common dependence on the society will admit. '5 0 Second, the
Senate should serve as a check on the inexorable impulse of the new
government to accretion of power. Federalism was to the states what
separation of powers was for the three great departments: an assur-
ance of non-encroachment.
1. The Mode of Election of Senators.-In late May 1787, Ed-
mund Randolph of Virginia proposed that the members of the "sec-
ond branch" (which would become the Senate) should be chosen by
those of the first.51 According to Randolph, the Senate he envisioned
would be smaller than the first so as "to be exempt from the passion-
ate proceedings to which numerous assembles are liable"; a good sen-
ate, he argued, would check "the turbulence and follies of
democracy. ' 52 Madison added that the Senate must be of limited
membership in order to proceed with "more coolness, with more sys-
tem, & with more wisdom .... The more the representatives of the
people therefore were multiplied, the more they partook of the infir-
mities of their constituents. '53 According to Madison, the question
was whether the Senate should be good or powerful; it might be both,
but the latter was more important: "When the weight of a set of men
depends merely on their personal characters; the greater the number
the greater the weight. When it depends on the degree of political
authority lodged in them the smaller the number the greater the
weight." 54
48 The terms-"terms" and "tenure"-are typically used interchangeably. More precisely,
"term" refers to the period of time established by the Constitution-six years for senators.
"Tenure" is a senator's length of service and may be multiple terms or may be less than a term if
the senator resigned, died, or otherwise failed to complete a term. Sula P. Richardson, Congres-
sional Tenure: A Review of Efforts to Limit House and Senate Service 1 (CRS Report Sept. 13,
1989).
49 1 FARRAND, supra note 35, at 152.
50 THm FEDERALiST No. 51, at 350 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
51 1 FARRAND, supra note 35, at 20.
52 Id. at 51.
53 Id. at 152.
54 Id.
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Randolph's proposal was met with criticism and alternative pro-
posals.55 Roger Sherman objected that a senate chosen by the repre-
sentatives would tend to be appointed out of that body, and that a
senate so selected would be too dependent, destroying its checking
function.56 George Read of Delaware suggested that senators should
be appointed by the Executive from persons nominated by state legis-
latures.5 7 The proposal found no support. James Wilson of Penn-
sylvania opposed both nomination by state legislatures and election by
the first branch; the second branch should be independent of both
bodies and both branches of the national legislature should be chosen
by the people.58 Madison agreed with Wilson to the extent the people
promised "as uncorrupt & impartial a preference of merit," but Wil-
son's proposal likewise found little support.5 9
Richard Spaight of North Carolina proposed that the second
branch be chosen by state legislatures, and his proposal was moved
again by John Dickinson.60 While the convention ultimately approved
this proposal, the delegates offered very different reasons for support-
ing it. Several delegates argued that a senate elected by state legisla-
tures, instead of selected by the people, would be more likely to
produce "fit men."'61 Elbridge Gerry, taking a page from the experi-
ence of the colonial councils, argued that "commercial & monied in-
terest [would] be more secure in the hands of the State Legislatures,
than of the people at large." 62 The former, he argued, "have more
sense of character, and will be restrained by that from injustice. 63
Since most states had two branches, "one of which is somewhat aristo-
cratic," there would be a "better chance of refinement in the choice"
of senators. 64 He repeated that "the great mercantile interest and of
stockholders" would be better represented "if the state legislatures
choose the second branch. '65 Madison added that the "Senate ought
to come from, & represent, the Wealth of the nation. 66
George Mason of Virginia took a very different, less instrumen-
talist approach. Drawing an analogy from the idea of separation of
55 See id. at 152 (statement of Elbridge Gerry).
56 Id. at 59.
57 Id. at 151.
58 Id. at 52, 58-59, 153-54, 159.
59 Id. at 154.
60 Id. at 51 (statement of Richard Spaight); id. at 150, 156, 158 (statement of John
Dickinson).
61 Id. at 154 (statement of Rep. Sherman).
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 155.
65 Id. at 157.
66 Id. at 158. Dickinson suggested that the Senate should "draw forth the first characters
either as to family or talent." Id. at 156.
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powers, which the delegates had "studiously endeavored to provide
for [the departments'] self-defence," Mason argued that the Constitu-
tion could not "leave the State alone unprovided with the means for
[self-defence]." 67 Mason believed that having the senate selected by
state legislatures would "prevent the encroachments on each other." 68
Dickinson offered a variation on this theme. The differing composi-
tion of the two houses, "like the British house of lords and commons,
whose powers flow from different sources, are mutual checks on each
other. ' 69 Mason summed up:
[W]e have agreed that the national Legislature shall have a negative on
the State Legislatures-the Danger is that the national, will swallow up
the State Legislatures-what will be a reasonable guard agt. this Danger,
and operate in favor of the State authorities-The answer seems to me
to be this, let the State Legislatures appoint the Senate- 70
In the wake of Mason's comments, the question of appointment by
state legislatures carried unanimously.71
Gerry and Mason offer a stark contrast in motivation for having
state legislatures choose senators. Their motivations are not inconsis-
tent but are pieces in a puzzle to help us understand why the Senate
was structured as it was. Gerry's rationale was instrumentalist. State
legislatures, themselves an elite group, would likely select a senate
that looked very much like themselves. Such a propertied body would
serve to protect the interests of the commercial and mercantile classes.
The mode of election was merely a means of securing protection to
the upper classes. However, Gerry's premise-that state legislatures
would elect persons drawn from the upper classes and that the voters
generally would not select such persons-was somewhat flawed.
Gerry's "aristocratic" element more likely controlled only the upper
houses in the state legislatures, while the voters whom Gerry feared
continued to control the lower houses. To the extent that Gerry was
correct that new Senate and House of Representatives would repre-
sent different economic interests, the bodies that would select the sen-
ators would mirror precisely those differences.
By contrast, Mason's view sought state selection of senators as a
good in itself. Mason wished to provide some mechanism for states to
defend themselves against "encroachment" by a national government
67 Id. at 155-56.
68 Id. at 157.
69 Id. at 156-57; see C. Euis STEVENS, SOURCES OF THE CoNsnTfrroN OF THE UNnTED
STATES 77-79 (reprint 1987) (2d ed. 1894) (discussing relationship of Senate to the House of
Lords and the Privy Council).
70 1 FARRAND, supra note 35, at 160.
71 Id.; see THE FEDERAUST No. 62, at 415-16 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
Mason's reference to a "negative" against state laws was a proposal that Congress should have a
veto over all state laws. It was defeated shortly after the vote in favor of state legislatures select-
ing senators. 1 FARRAND, supra note 35, at 169-71.
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that everyone recognized would have significantly more power than
any American sovereign since July 3, 1776. A senate appointed by
state legislatures would be a near-complete defense to national en-
croachment because the senate controlled one-half of Congress. In-
deed, several early commentators noted that if the states refused to
send or to pay their senators, it would frustrate Congress entirely.72
Thus, in Mason's view, the states, rather than Gerry's upper classes,
were the plan's primary beneficiaries.
2. Length of Senatorial Tenure. -The delegates agreed generally
that senators should serve longer than representatives. Delegates pro-
posed terms of three, four, five, six, seven, and nine years; others pro-
posed tenure during "good behavior" and even life tenure.73 William
Pierce of Georgia feared that any term longer than three years would
"raise an alarm" with the people and would remind them of the
"[g]reat mischiefs" in England.74 Charles Coatesworth Pinckney of
South Carolina thought that longer terms worked against the southern
states, whose senators had farther to travel. "If the Senators should
be appointed for a long term, they [would] settle in the State where
they exercised their functions; and would in a little time be rather the
representatives of that than of the State appoint[ing] them. '75 Sher-
man thought seven years was too long. If senators did their duty, then
they should be re-elected; but "if they acted amiss, an earlier opportu-
nity should be allowed for getting rid of them. ' 76
In the end, the delegates opted for stability in the Senate. For
Randolph, the longer term guarded against "Democratic licentious-
ness."' 77 Madison thought seven years would not give "too much sta-
bility" to the government and feared more that "the popular branch
72 See THE FEDERALIST No. 59, at 400 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961); 4
THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CON-
STITUTION 58 (photo. reprint 1941) (J. Elliot ed., 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES] (state-
ment of William Davie). The Constitution granted Congress power to prescribe the "times,
Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives," U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 4, cl. 1, apparently to forestall the possibility of the states refusing to elect senators. See 3
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra, at 366 (statement of James Madison); 46 CoNe. REC. 2649 (1911)
(statement of Sen. Borah); id. at 2766-67 (statement of Sen. Rayner). The Convention also
voted to pay Senators from the national treasury, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1, to prevent states
from effectively shutting down Congress by refusing to pay their senators. 2 FARRAND, supra
note 35, at 291-92.
73 1 FARRAND, supra note 35, at 218, 408-09, 415, 421 (various proposals). Alexander Hamil-
ton suggested life tenure, id. at 300, a prooosal which John Jay supported. MArN, supra note 36,
at 217.
74 1 FARRAND, supra note 35, at 218.
75 Id. at 421. See also Brutus, No. 16 (April 10, 1788) ("Six years is a long period for man to
be absent from his home, it would have a tendency to wean him from his constituents."), in 2
THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 220 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
76 1 FARRAND, supra note 35, at 218.
77 Id.
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would still be too great an overmatch for it."78 At the same time,
however, Madison warned against re-election to lengthy terms. He
thought even nine years was not too long, provided that the "long
term allowed to the 2d. branch should not commence till such a period
of life as would render a perpetual disqualification to be re-elected
little inconvenient either in a public or private view."'79
The lengthy term for senators ensured a long view of problems.
Though the question of tenure did not directly concern senators' du-
ties to their states, the longer term shielded states from precipitous
actions by the House. Democratic excesses against the people might
be cured as easily as they were created, but offenses to states might
require greater time to rectify. The nature of the constituencies of the
two houses suggests that the states had more to lose than the masses,
and that the longer terms for senators secured the states' position.
3. Per Capita Voting and State Representation in the Senate.-
From the questions of mode of election and term of office, the con-
vention then turned to the important question of state representation
in the Senate. Without recounting all of the debate, much of which
should be familiar to us, I will mention several important points which
bear on the present discussion.
The great debate, of course, was over whether the states should
have equal suffrage, suffrage based on population like the House, or
something in between.8 0 Often overlooked in the Great Compromise,
which gave each state equal representation in the Senate and propor-
tional representation in the House, was the decision that each state
should send two senators. Gouverneur Morris suggested that each
state elect three senators. This brought objections from several dele-
gates who argued that the senate would be too numerous, particularly
as new states were added to the union.81 The convention had no
sooner approved two senators when Luther Martin of Maryland ob-
jected to the senators voting per capita. It "depart[ed] from the idea
of the States being represented in the 2d. branch."8 2 Without much
further recorded discussion, the states voted nine to one (Maryland
casting the sole negative vote) to permit representation per capita.8 3
The implications of the per capita vote far exceed the space allot-
ted to the issue in Madison's notes on the Constitutional Convention.
The Great Compromise, after all, had been over the question of
78 Id.; see also GORDON S. WOOD, TmE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787,
at 436 (1969).
79 1 FARRAND, supra note 35, at 423.
80 For example, Pinkney proposed that no state would have fewer than one vote, nor more
than three. Id. at 155.
81 2 FARRAND, supra note 35, at 94.
82 Id.
83 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 ("each Senator shall have one Vote").
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whether states should be represented equally in the Senate. Having
agreed to that momentous proposition, the convention provided with-
out discussion that the delegates could vote independently and split
their votes, and the convention, voting by states, approved the propo-
sition. That action seems contrary to the idea of state representa-
tion.84 The delegates may have assumed that there were other means,
aside from voting by delegation, for state legislatures to assure a uni-
fied vote. The reasons for approving per capita voting may have had
more to do with the delegates' practical experience than with a desire
to undermine state representation. The Founders had a great deal of
experience with divided caucuses, and even with caucuses that went
unrepresented because of evenly divided votes. Per capita voting en-
sured that states would be represented, even if they were not repre-
sented consistently.85 It also helped assure that divided delegations
would not abstain and frustrate action by the Senate at all.
The Founders also may have assumed that per capita voting
would better represent the states, even if a state's senators split their
votes. Madison thought that corruption in the Senate would be un-
likely without corrupting state legislatures themselves because "the
periodical change of members would otherwise regenerate the whole
body. '86 Even as a pair of senators represented a state, they would
represent different moods or political sentiments. Senators elected by
shifting majorities in the state legislatures would accurately reflect the
shifting political sentiments of the people.
4. The Senate's Constitutional Functions.-The Senate and the
House of Representatives mirrored different aspects of American
political life. But their duties of representation were potentially in
tension only in those matters in which the Senate and House had to
agree-principally in the making of laws and amending the Constitu-
tion. Other functions of national self government were entrusted to a
single house of the legislature. To the Senate, the Constitution con-
ferred the power to advise the President on appointments and consent
to their approval, to confirm treaties, and to try impeachments. 87
There was no formal connection between the states and the Sen-
ate's advice and consent power or its impeachment powers. It was,
however, implicit in the relationship between states and their senators.
Hamilton wrote that the Senate's consent to appointment served as
84 Lewis Henry Boutell, Roger Sherman in the Federal Convention, S. Doc. No. 406, 56th
Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1902) ("The proposition... that the Senators vote per capita ... removed
from the proceedings of the Senate all appearances of State action."); see Diamond, The Feder-
alist on Federalism, supra note 25, at 1282.
85 See Roy SANDSTROM, Ti UNITED STATES SENATE, 1787-1801, S. Doc. No. 64, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. 172-74 (1961) (discussing split voting in the first Congresses).
86 Ti FEDERALIST No. 63, at 429 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
87 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 3, cl. 7; id. art. II, cl. 2.
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"an excellent check upon the spirit of favoritism in the President, and
would tend greatly to preventing the appointment of unfit characters
from State prejudice."' 8
Although the framers denied the states a formal role in the ap-
pointments process, they contemplated that the states would never-
theless serve some role. During the debates over the Appointments
Clause,89 Edmund Randolph observed that the appointment power
vested in Congress and the President was "formidable" and asked
whether some appointments should be left to the states.90 Dickinson
then moved to except from the President's power those appointments
"where by law the appointment shall be vested in the Legislatures or
Executives of the several States." 91 James Wilson replied that if this
provision were enacted, state legislatures would issue "a standing in-
struction.., to pass no law creating officers, unless the [appointments]
be referred to them." 92 The motion was defeated.
The Constitution also conferred on the President and the Senate
the power to commit the United States to treaties, 93 and it expressly
denied to the states the power to enter into "any Treaty, alliance, or
Confederation. '94 Conferring the ratifying power upon the Senate,
where states were equally represented, made it less likely that the
United States would "make treaties without an equal eye to the inter-
ests of all the states," which had surrendered their sovereignty in this
area.95 Indeed, the power the Senate possessed in foreign affairs
paled in comparison with the power the Constitution required the
states to cede to the national government.
C. The Limits of Accountability
The debates in the Federal Convention show two important pur-
poses in the design of the Senate. First, the delegates were reluctant
to turn the government over entirely to democratic whims. The Sen-
ate was the delegates' response to this concern. It was a tempering
institution, a body of elite senators whose terms and manner of elec-
tion ensured greater stability in the Congress. With their terms three
times longer than those of their House counterparts, senators could
take a more detached view of issues coming before Congress. They
88 THE FEDERAUST No. 76, at 513 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
89 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
90 2 FARRAN, supra note 35, at 405.
91 Id. at 406.
92 Id.
93 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
94 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; see THm FEDERALiST No. 22, at 144 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
95 THm FEDERALIST No. 64, at 437 (John Jay) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961); see 2 FARRAND,
supra note 35, at 392 (statement of James Madison); THm FEDERALIST No. 66, at 450 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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were not subject to the same kind of repetitive review in the two-year
election cycle, which constituted the Eighteenth Century equivalent of
government by poll.
Second, the Senate protected the states as states; it stood as a
defense to the federal government in the same way that each of the
three branches of the national government had checks and balances
against abuse of power by the other branches. The Senate stood to
ensure that the system remained federal. Although the Senate com-
prised only half of the legislative branch, the principle of bicameralism
guaranteed that Congress could not pass legislation without the con-
currence of the Senate; the House of Representatives had no override
to a Senate veto. While the Senate could not affirmatively approve
legislation without the assent of the House, in a government of enu-
merated powers, it was sufficient for the states to possess the negative
veto.
There was a natural tension between the idea of senators as coun-
ters to popular democracy (and, therefore, required to exercise in-
dependent judgment) and senators as the states' representatives (and,
therefore, accountable to the states).96 Manner of election, the length
of senators' terms, and per capita voting gave senators a measure of
independence. On the other hand, the manner of election and the fact
that the states were represented proportionally suggested that sena-
tors had an obligation to the states; if the states were not to be repre-
sented as such, the Great Compromise was no compromise at all.
The states needed one or more mechanisms for ensuring the sen-
ators' accountability. The convention and the state ratifying conven-
tions considered three familiar devices for the task: instruction of
senators, recall, and rotation in office.97
96 Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1485, 1508 (1994). Frank
Easterbrook has explained how representation helps to cure self-interest: "[A] representative's
self-interest is not at stake in the vast majority of votes, and in any event, is not identical to the
interests of constituents. Mediating among many factions, the representative answers to none."
Frank H. Easterbrook, The State of Madison's Vision of the State: A Public Choice Perspective,
107 HARV. L. REv. 1328, 1331-32 (1994). Of course, that a representative can be said to repre-
sent no individual is not to say that the representative represents no one. A senator representing
a state in fact represents numerous factions within that state, which are themselves represented
variously in the state legislature.
97 Professor Willi Adams locates these controls as part and parcel of more familiar mecha-
nisms such as a bill of rights and the system of checks and balances: "The limiting of [colonial]
governmental powers took several forms. The two most fundamental of these were the Bills of
Rights and the fixed procedures for ratifying and amending constitutions. The third consisted of
a number of technical measures: limited terms of office, instructions for representatives, restric-
tions on reelection, and the system of checks and balances, including the controls the two legisla-
tive chambers exert over each other." WILLI P. ADAMS, Tim FIRST AMERICAN CONSTnUTIONS
243-44 (Rita Kimber & Robert Kimber trans., 1980) (footnote omitted); see also Diamond, The
Federalist on Federalism, supra note 25, at 1281-82.
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1. Instruction of Senators.-The most significant and controver-
sial constraint on senators considered by the drafters was the right of
state legislatures to instruct their senators. 98 The right had honorable
origins in both the British and the colonial experience, particularly in
the states of the South and Northeast. 99 As the colonists came to
think of themselves as those who governed rather than those who
were governed, the people began to think of their representatives as
their agents rather than their guardians; legislators represented the
people in the same way that an agent, ambassador, or attorney was
bound to accede to the wishes of his principal.' 00 In America, there
was greater sentiment than in England that representatives were
bound by instructions from their constituents.101
The right of instruction improved upon the more familiar right of
petition, but the two are not the same. Petitions request that the legis-
lature take a specified action, while instructions insist that the legisla-
ture take the action.'0 2 The legislature had the right, after
consideration, to reject a petition; but in theory, it could not fail to
98 Instructions are distinct from credentials, which are the initial authorization to a represen-
tative or agent. Kenneth Colgrove, The Early History of State Instructions to Members of Con-
gress, 1774-1812, at 1-2 (1915) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University).
99 ADAMS, supra note 97, at 246-47; THOMAS E. CRONIN, DmcRT DEMOCRACY 24-25 (1989);
EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN ENG-
LAND AND AMERICA 209-23 (1988); JOHN P. REID, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION IN THE
AGE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 96-118 (1989); Margaret E. Monsell, "Stars in the Constel-
lation of the Commonwealth": Massachusetts Towns and the Constitutional Right of Instruction,
29 NEw ENG. L. REV. 285,288-99 (1995). Instruction found its broadest support in Jeffersonian
Republicans and Jacksonian Democrats and was not favored by more elitist Federalists and
Whigs. CRONIN, supra, at 25. The doctrine was understood in England and practiced to varying
degrees in Europe. ROBERT LUCE, LEGISLATIVE PRINCIPLES: THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF
LAWMAKING By REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 439-48 (1930).
Early discussions of the right of instruction are found in An Argument on the Right of the
Constituent to Instruct his Representative in Congress, 4 AM. REV. 137 (1812) [hereinafter The
Right of the Constituent to Instruct]; Instructions to Representatives, 4 AM. JURIST 314 (1830); 4
AM. LJ. 571 (1813).
100 REID, supra note 99, at 105; see also Kenneth Bresler, Rediscovering the Right to Instruct
Legislators, 26 NEw ENG. L REV. 355,360 (1991). John Adams once wrote that representation
was "in reality nothing more than this, the people choose attorneys to vote for them in the great
council of the nation, reserving always the fundamentals of the government, reserving also a
right to give their attorneys instructions how to vote, and a right at certain, stated intervals, of
choosing a-new... It is this reservation of fundamentals, of the right of giving instructions, and
of new elections, which creates a popular check upon the whole government." ADAMS, supra
note 97, at 233 (citation omitted); see ANNALS OF CONG., 11th Cong., 3d Sess. 154 (1811) (state-
ment of Sen. Leib); WOOD, supra note 78, at 188-89. See also iL at 173-88. For a modem theory
of legislators as representatives in the attorney-client model, see Marci A. Hamilton, Discussion
and Decisions: A Proposal to Replace The Myth of Self-Rule with An Attorneyship Model of
Representation, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 477 (1994).
101 REID, supra note 99, at 102-03.
102 See LUTHER S. CUSHING, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF LEGISLATIVE ASSEM-
BLIES IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 287 (9th ed. 1907) (stating that state legislatures
could instruct senators only "by means of a legislative act, passed in the ordinary form").
HeinOnline -- 91 Nw. U. L. Rev.  517 1996-1997
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
follow instructions10 3 As Gordon Wood explains, "Petitioning im-
plied that the representative was a superior" while instructing "im-
plied that the delegate.., was simply a mistrusted agent."' 0 While
the people occasionally abused their right of instruction, in general,
the people only instructed their representatives on the most important
of issues, and even then they were often careful to commit the matter
to their delegate's good judgment.105
By instructing, a state legislature assumed responsibility for the
votes of its senator. The political liabilities fell to the legislature
rather than the individual senator. This shift of responsibility acted as
a constraint on the state legislatures' willingness to instruct on contro-
versial or difficult matters, and it undoubtedly prompted some sena-
tors to seek instruction as a way of insulating themselves. 06 State
legislatures exercising their right of instruction did not encroach their
senators' independence except as to that particular matter. State leg-
islatures could not hope to instruct in all matters. But they could in-
struct on matters of great importance to the state or the people. 0 7
Significantly, by instructing its senators, a state legislature overcame
the consequences (at least to the state) of per capita voting and united
its delegation in the Senate.
The Senate provided a perfect opportunity for the exercise of the
right, and through the first century of the nation, the controversial
practice survived because of two facts. First, state legislatures, knowl-
edgeable in matters before Congress and familiar with their constitu-
ents, were well situated to instruct their senators. The legislative body
was a discrete group, easily convened to adopt instructions. The idea
of legislative instruction fit well with the idea that senators repre-
sented the states. By contrast, members of the House of Representa-
tives could not be so conveniently instructed. Their natural
constituency was the voters themselves, who could not so efficiently
convene to instruct their representatives. Since representatives had to
stand for election every two years, the frequency of election guaran-
teed that representatives would inform themselves of their constitu-
ents' views. The legislature could not instruct perfectly in the affairs
of individual congressional districts because, as a collegial body, it was
only capable of instructing for the jurisdiction it represented-the
state at large. State legislators, recognizing these limitations, sought
103 RAYMOND C. BAILEY, POPULAR INFLUENCE UPON PUBLIC POLICY: PETrIIONING IN
EIGHTEENTH-CENmURY VIRGINIA 31-32 (1979).
104 WOOD, supra note 78, at 189.
105 ADAMS, supra note 97, at 246-47.
106 See, e.g., 32 CONG. REC. 838-39 (1899) (request of Sen. Perkins seeking instructions on
ratification of a treaty with Spain).
107 See infra notes 146-59 and accompanying text.
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only to instruct their senators; they would only advise the state's dele-
gation in the House of Representatives of their views.108
Second, the state legislatures elected senators and could re-elect
them.10 9 Accordingly, there was an efficient mechanism-the legisla-
ture-for advising senators, and a means-refusal to re-elect-for dis-
ciplining those who disobeyed instructions. The mechanism was
imperfect because there was no contemporaneous means for compel-
ling senators to obey instructions, and the practice of instruction was
never fully accepted as a political doctrine. The system of instruction
depended on senators regarding the legislature that sent them as their
constituents, or as the proper representatives of the people.110 Sena-
tors-quite naturally-resented having their judgment on national is-
sues dictated or second-guessed by local politicians,111 and they
resented the idea that the President and other states might meddle in
their own state's politics to bring about a particular instruction.112
a. The constitutional debates over instruction.-By 1789,
several states had expressly guaranteed the right of instruction in their
108 Clement Eaton, Southern Senators and the Right of Instruction, 1789-1860, 18 J.S. HIST.
303, 303 (1952). See, for example, the form of a Virginia Resolution condemning Andrew Jack-
son's decision to remove federal funds from the Bank of the United States: "Resolved, That our
Senators be instructed, and our Representatives be requested.. . ." CONG. DEB., 23d Cong., 1st
Sess. 2840 (1834) (emphasis added); see Colgrove, supra note 98, at 1-18 ("[T]here does not
appear to have been a single instance in which a State legislature claimed to be the constituency
of the Representatives."). Representatives, however, sometimes accepted these resolutions as
instructions. See, e.g., ANNALS OF CONG., 14th Cong., 2d Sess. 494-95 (1817) (statements of
Reps. Robertson and Clay).
109 A senator "held his place there, subject to the control of the Legislature... and whenever
their instructions reached him, he should be governed by them." CONG. DEB., 23d Cong., 2d
Sess. 255 (1835) (statement of Sen. King).
110 See CONO. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3728 (1866) (statement of Sen. Williams) (discuss-
ing recorded voting for senators in state legislatures: "Members of the Legislative Assembly are
frequently instructed by their constituents as to how they shall vote in the choice of a Senator,
and I think those constituents have a right to know as to whether or not that representative
obeys those instructions."). See also the interesting colloquies between Ohio Senators Thomas
Morris and Thomas Ewing over their duty to follow contradictory instructions, CONG. DEB., 24th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1021-28 (1836); between Tennessee Senators John Bell and Andrew Johnson
over Senator Bell's declination to follow a resolution to admit Kansas to the union, CONG.
GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 804-13 (1858); and between California Senators Stephen White and
George Perkins over White's refusal to follow instructions to approve treaty with Spain, 32
CONo. REc. 838-42 (1899).
111 "There is no public man that requires instructions more than I do .... but I do not like to
have it come in too imperative a shape." CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 275 (1850) (state-
ment of Sen. Webster); see SAms'ROM, supra note 85, at 170 (stating that in contrast to the
Articles of Confederation, the Constitution freed state legislatures from legislating for the union,
allowing them to focus on state issues).
112 EATON, supra note 108, at 316 ("The practice of instructions in the 1830's constituted a
standing invitation to the President to intervene in state politics and purge his opponents .... ).
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constitutions, 1 3 and the right figured prominently in the ratifying de-
bates and in the debates during the drafting of the Bill of Rights.
Although no formal proposal for a right of instruction was debated in
the first state ratifying conventions, the right of instruction was men-
tioned frequently and was assumed always to exist. In Massachusetts,
Rufus King thought that "state legislatures, if they find their [sena-
tors] erring, can and will instruct them."'1 14 These "public instruc-
tions" would constitute a "check" that only the most "hardy" would
ignore.115 In New York, Hamilton agreed that the people had a right
to instruct their representatives, and the state legislatures had a right
to instruct their senators." 6 John Jay assumed that instructions would
constitute "a constant correspondence," 117 while in Virginia, James
Monroe asserted that senators had a "duty to obey their direc-
tions."" 8 Both Virginia and North Carolina proposed amendments
guaranteeing the right of the people "to instruct their rep-
resentatives."119
On August 15, 1789, during debates over what would become the
First Amendment, Thomas Tucker of South Carolina pointed out that
the proposed amendment omitted the right "to instruct their repre-
sentatives,"'120 as requested by North Carolina and Virginia. The pro-
posed amendment initially caused a great deal of confusion. Madison
pointed out that Congress was prepared to secure the freedom of
speech and the press, and the right of the people to petition their rep-
resentatives. If the amendment meant the people could advise their
representatives, it was redundant. He asked if it meant that delegates
113 E.g., MASS. DECL. OF ROrrs art. XIX (1780), reprinted in 1 BENJAMIN PERLEY POORE,
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF
THE UNITED STATES 959 (2d ed. 1878) [hereinafter FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUnONS]; N.H.
CONST. OF 1784 art. XXXII, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 1283;
N.C. DECL. OF RIGHTS art. XVIII (1776), reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
supra, at 1410; VT. DECL OF Rioirrs art. XXII (1786), reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 1869. The right of instruction was frequently found in a state's bill of
rights, usually together with the right of petition or consultation.
114 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 72, at 47.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 252.
117 Id. at 283.
118 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 72, at 334. But see id. at 355 (statement of Patrick
Henry) ("[Y]ou may instruct them and offer your opinions; but if they think them improper they
may disregard them"; arguing for a right of recall to enforce instructions.).
119 Id. at 658-59 (Virginia); 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 72, at 244 (North Carolina).
Virginia "enjoin[ed]" its representatives "to exert all their influence and use all reasonable and
legal methods, to obtain" these amendments. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 72, at 661.
120 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 732 (Gales & Seaton eds., 1834) (Aug. 15, 1789). The debates of
1789 are found in two different reports, each with its own pagination. For clarity, I have fol-
lowed citations of volume one with the exact date.
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were obliged to follow the instructions.121 The amendment's support-
ers assured him it did. The right to instruct, argued John Page of Vir-
ginia, followed directly from the right of petition: "[T]o what end will
[the right of the people to consult] be done, if they have not the power
of instructing their representatives? Instruction and representation in
a Republic appear .. to be inseparably connected."1 22 Maryland's
Michael Stone opposed the proposition because it bespoke "a democ-
racy of singular properties," and that once representatives were in-
structed to the contrary, "any law passed by the Legislature would be
of no force." 123
The latter idea brought the proposal into focus. What were the
consequences of failure to follow instructions, and were there circum-
stances-if the instructions violated the Constitution or the member's
conscience-under which a member could rightfully ignore the in-
structions? 124 As Senator William Maclay later noted, if laws passed
contrary to instructions were void altogether or void in that state, then
the states had been given a veto over federal legislation.125 Moreover,
the members had posed a question unique to the House of Represent-
atives: the Senate represented the states and could look to their re-
spective state legislatures, but to whom should the members of the
House look for instructions? 126 Tucker's proposal failed by a sizeable
majority in the House,127 and a similar proposal fared no better in the
Senate.128
Although Tucker's amendment provided a useful opportunity for
the Founders to discuss the doctrine of instruction, the inferences to
be drawn from the amendment's failure are few. We cannot conclude
that the Founders thought that a right of instruction was contrary to
constitutional design because they only considered the right in the
context of the House of Representatives, a place for which it was ill-
suited. That body was distinct from the Senate in size, term, and
mode of election. House districts were smaller than states, and the
121 Id. at 738; see also id. at 735-37 (statements of Reps. Clymer, Sherman, Jackson and
Gerry).
122 Id. at 734.
123 Id. at 739.
124 Id. at 738-39 (statement of Rep. Madison); id. at 740 (statement of Rep. Gerry); see also 3
ELUOT's DEBATES, supra note 72, at 334 (statement of James Monroe explaining why he ig-
nored his instructions).
125 WILLIAM MACLAY, Trm JOURNAL OF WILLIAM MACLAY, UNITED STATES SENATOR FOR
PENNSYLVANIA, 1789-1791, at 215 (1927); see ANNALS OF CONG., 11th Cong., 3d Sess. 194-95
(1811) (statement of Sen. Giles) (A senator had a "constitutional and legal right to disobey his
instructions" because "a law passed by a vote in disobedience of instructions is as valid as a law
passed by a vote in obedience to instructions.").
126 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 120, at 742 (statement of Rep. Livermore); id. at 743
(statement of Rep. Sedgwick); id. (statement of Rep. Ames) (Aug. 15, 1789).
127 The vote was 41 to 10 against Tcker's amendment. Id. at 747.
128 SENATE JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 117 (1789).
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people at large were poorly situated to control House members
through instruction. Realistically, only a discrete body such as a state
legislature could issue instructions.
Opponents of instruction had two general objections. First, they
protested that it infringed the representatives' independent judg-
ment.129 Undoubtedly, instruction transferred power from represent-
atives back to the people. But the objection was overstated because
the people issued instructions only for the most important, or at least
the most visible, issues. The reasons for this are obvious: the body
politic had neither the time nor the will to govern itself in a pure de-
mocracy and for that reason had chosen a legislative agent. For some
issues about which the electorate felt strongly, it was willing to assem-
ble and define by consensus a set of instructions. Second, instruction's
opponents objected that representatives should not be obligated to
obey instructions because representatives represented the whole.130
On this theory, each representative was responsible to the entire com-
munity, and not just to his own province. This was a far more difficult
proposition to defend. Carried to its extreme, it destroyed any need
for local elections. If representatives represented the whole, they
might be selected by the whole, and few were willing to go so far.
Asking legislative agents to represent the whole of the people, and not
just their district or state, not only asked too much, but homogenized
all notion of competing faction.' 3'
The instruction debates again highlight the tension between the
Fohnders' desire for an independent legislative body-secured
through a six-year term-and a body to represent the states-secured
through selection by legislatures. The Founders' desire that the Sen-
ate be independent is not inconsistent with the doctrine of instruction.
States did not, in practice, and could not, even in theory, issue instruc-
tions on all matters, any more than the electorate could monitor all
decisions of its elected representatives. That is the economy of repre-
sentative government. A state's control over its senators through in-
structions was never absolute, and senators retained a great deal of
discretion and independence. But there is no denying that instruction
was important to the states and was resented and resisted by some
senators. This resistance may reflect simple policy disagreements, or
129 REID, supra note 99, at 105.
130 E.g., The Right of the Constituent to Instruct, supra note 99, at 143 ("[T]he power dele-
gated ... is to be exercised for the benefit of the community."); ANNALS OF CONG., 11th Cong.,
3d Sess. 194 (1811) (statement of Sen. Giles); see REID, supra note 99, at 105-06.
131 See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961); BICKEL, supra
note 24, at 14-19 ("What we have evolved, therefore, is not majority rule, but a pluralist system
... of minorities rule."); Easterbrook, supra note 96, at 1332 ("Elections from different states
with different factions dilute the power of faction.").
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it may reflect a natural reluctance by these senators to admit their
dependence on someone else's judgment.
In one sense, making the right of instruction formal in the Consti-
tution would have been superfluous. The people did not lose any
right to instruct their representatives. By not including the right in the
First Amendment, the First Congress avoided the difficult question of
enforcement. Although Representative Stone thought that laws were
a nullity if passed with votes cast in violation of the members' instruc-
tions, it is not clear that anyone else, including Thomas Tucker, agreed
with him. So what were the consequences? Did violation of instruc-
tion invite judicial review of the law (although in today's parlance, it
probably would be a "political question"); or was the delegate de-
frocked automatically; or did the violations merely alert the state leg-
islature, which might exercise a power of recall? 132 The right's
omission from the Constitution left to the legislatures the right to in-
struct their senators and then determine for themselves whether the
penalty for disobedience was recall, refusal to re-elect, or something
else.
On the other hand, the lack of an express constitutional right of
instruction diminished the legislatures' claim to exercise of the right
and lent credence to the argument that senators were accountable
only to the people. In an address during the debates over the Second
Bank of the United States, Senator Giles of Virginia argued that in-
struction was contrary to the spirit of the new Constitution that "oper-
ate[d] upon the people of the United States in their individual
characters," in contrast to the Articles of Confederation which "oper-
ated upon the States in their corporate characters.' u3 3 Giles acknowl-
edged the duty of representatives to obey instructions of "the people,
as the legitimate source of all power."'u3 But acknowledging the right
of the people to instruct was an empty theory because there was no
mechanism for the people to give such instructions; Giles' argument
simply freed senators from accountability to state legislatures. 135 It
also laid bare the important differences between the unicameral Con-
gress of the Articles of Confederation and the bicameral Constitution.
Under the former, the people were represented imperfectly through
their state citizenship. By providing for a House and Senate, the Con-
stitution satisfied the democratic impulse and the need for sectional-
132 See Bresler, supra note 100, at 384-86 (discussing the enforcing of instructions).
133 ANNALS OF CONO., 11th Cong., 3d Sess. 196 (1811).
134 Id. at 199.
135 Even Giles admitted the right of the people to instruct "if practicable." Id. Contrast
Giles's views with John C. Calhoun's claim that in instructions "the people of this country [have]
matched the power of deliberation from this body[,J ... [t]hey [have] resolved the Government
into its original elements, and reserved to themselves their primitive power of legislation." AN-
NALS OF CONO., 14th Cong., 2d Sess. 576 (1817).
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ism. While both the House and the Senate respected state
geographical boundaries, the Constitution apportioned House seats
roughly by population; it respected the democracy of what would be-
come "one person/one vote" proportionality. The Senate defied any
such connection. Instruction helped ensure fidelity to the states as a
political entity and, indirectly, to the people who comprised it.
b. The early practice of instruction. -The Founders' failure
to include an express right of instruction did not deter the states, many
of which had-and many of which continue to have-a right under
their own constitutions to instruct their legislators. 136 The question of
the role of instruction arose in the First Congress. 37 The Senate, un-
like the House, had refused to deliberate in public. These closed ses-
sions enjoyed broad support among the Federalists, whose economic
policies had the support of Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Ham-
ilton. In December 1789, Virginia instructed its senators to secure
"one of the important privileges of the people" by obtaining their
"free admission" to the Senate.' 38 Virginia's resolution was ig-
nored,' 39 and Maryland, New York, North Carolina, South Carolina,
and Virginia instructed their senators to press again for open meet-
ings.140 When Senator James Monroe of Virginia again urged such
action, the debate turned from the merits of open sessions to the
states' right to instruct. "[N]o legislature has any right to instruct at
all," claimed Federalist Senator Izard of South Carolina, while Con-
necticut's Oliver Ellsworth stated that instructions "amounted to no
more than a wish and ought to be no further regarded.' 141 Monroe's
motion was defeated seventeen to nine, with one Senator each from
Maryland, North Carolina, and South Carolina voting contrary to his
instructions. 42
Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia reissued
their instructions, making it clear that senators were "bound by the
instructions of the legislature ... where such instructions are not re-
136 LUCE, supra note 99, at 454-55; Bresler, supra note 100, at 364 n.57 (listing states currently
having such a right).
137 See SANDSTROM, supra note 85, at 161-62; David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress:
The First Congress and the Structure of Government, 1789-1791, 2 U. Cm. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE
161, 172-73 (1995).
138 Elizabeth G. McPherson, The Southern States and the Reporting of Senate Debates, 1789-
1802, 12 J.S. HisT. 223, 228 (1946) (citation omitted). The movement followed criticism of the
Senate's closed deliberations over the Jay Treaty. See STANLEY ELKINs & ERic McKITRICK,
THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 417-18 (1993).
139 ANNALS OF CONo., 1st Cong., 2d Sess. 967-68 (Apr. 29-30, 1790); SENATE JOURNAL, 1st
Cong., 2d Sess. 64, 65-66 (1790).
140 McPherson, supra note 138, at 229-31.
141 MACLAY, supra note 125, at 387-89.
142 1 ANNALS OF CONG., 1st Cong., 3d Sess. 1768 (Feb. 24, 1791); SENATE JOURNAL, 1st
Cong., 3d Sess. 123-24 (1791).
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pugnant to the constitution of the United States" and condemning the
senators' refusal as not justified "by any refinement of theory."'143
Senators from Maryland and South Carolina again ignored their in-
structions, and this time Maryland issued a vote of censure. 44 Ulti-
mately, in 1794, the Senate agreed to open its doors, and in its
resolution of approval the Senate identified itself as "the Representa-
tives of the sovereignties of the individual states."'145
States instructed their senators and representatives during this
early period in other significant matters as well. Kentucky, for exam-
ple, instructed them through the Kentucky Resolution to procure re-
peal of the "unconstitutional and obnoxious" Sedition Act.146 States
issued instructions on the recharter of the Bank of the United
States;147 the question of recognition of English common law;148 the
compensation of Congress;149 construction of bridges; 50 cod and
whale fishing;' 51 pensions;152 construction of a Marine hospital; 153 fu-
tures;154 free coinage of silver;155 the admission of Kansas, California,
West Virginia, and New Mexico as states;156 slavery;157 presidential
143 McPherson, supra note 138, at 233 (citations omitted).
144 ANNALS OF CONG., 2d Cong., 1st Sess. 113 (1792); SENATE JOURNAL, 2d Cong., 1st Sess.
165 (1792); McPherson, supra note 138, at 234; see also CARL N. EVERSTINE, THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY OF MARYLAND, 1776-1850, at 209-17 (1982).
145 ANNALS OF CONG., 3d Cong., 1st Sess. 33-34 (1794).
146 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 72, at 542. There is some disagreement over whether the
Kentucky Resolution was in the form of instruction. See Colgrove, supra note 98, at X-45, 46 &
n.63 (noting that Kentucky Senator Marshall failed to move repeal of the Alien and Sedition
Laws as requested, to public disapproval but no official censure). Compare Riker, supra note 5,
at 457 (Kentucky Resolution constituted instructions) with Wayne D. Moore, Reconceiving Inter-
pretive Autonomy: Insights from the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, 11 CoNsT. COMM. 315,
322 (1994) (Kentucky Resolution was a petition and not an instruction).
147 ANNALS OF CONG., 11th Cong., 3d Sess. 153-54 (1811) (instructions of Pennsylvania); id. at
201 (instructions of Virginia).
148 1 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 438 (St. George Tucker ed., 1803).
149 See ANNALS OF CONG., 14th Cong., 2d Sess. 594 (1817) (referring to instructions of
Massachusetts).
150 Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 524, 526-27
(1851) (instructions of Ohio to obtain bridge funding; instructions of Pennsylvania to oppose
bridge construction).
151 LucE, supra note 99, at 461 (instructions of Massachusetts).
152 Id.
153 Colgrove, supra note 98, at X-35.
154 24 CoNG. REc 992 (1893) (statement of Sen. Vest) (referring to instructions of
Mississippi).
155 7 CONG. REC. 1061 (1878) (instructions of Mississippi).
156 Virginia v. West Virginia, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 39, 58-59 (1870) (Virginia instructions to ob-
tain consent of Congress to admit West Virginia to union; describing this as an "emphatic legisla-
tive proposition"); CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 804 (1858) (Tennessee resolution
instructing senators to vote to admit Kansas as a state); CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 52
(1850) (Vermont instructions to admit New Mexico and California).
157 CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1850) (instructions of Vermont); id. at 275 (state-
ment of Sen. Webster, referring to instructions from Northern states).
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censure;158 and various constitutional amendments, including the
Eleventh and Twelfth Amendments. 159
The Senators who received instructions contrary to their own
views faced a difficult dilemma. Some, believing their obligation
fixed, announced they would follow instructions. 160 Others accepted
the instructions as advisory, but denied their binding effect. 161 Still
other senators rationalized that they were relieved of their duty if the
instructions might violate the Constitution, 162 or more likely, if the
Senator believed the legislature issued its instructions without full
information. 163
In fact, a number of senators resigned rather than follow instruc-
tions from their home legislatures, and several determined not to
stand for re-election over their differences. 164 During the vituperative
debates over Andrew Jackson and the rechartering of the second
Bank of the United States,165 the New Hampshire legislature, after
issuing a lengthy preamble and instructions, resolved,
That the honorable Samuel Bell, since his re-election to the Senate of
the United States, has pursued a course in defiance of the wishes of the
people of New Hampshire; that he has long misrepresented, and now
misrepresents, the opinions of a majority of his constituents, and that he
be and hereby is requested to resign his seat, agreeably to the solemn
pledge heretofore made by him. 166
158 CONG. GLOBE, 23d Cong., 1st Sess. 315-16 (1834) (instructions of Maine, New Jersey, and
Ohio); see also CONG. GLOBE, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. 159 (1836) (instructions of New Jersey).
159 See ANNALS OF CONG., 8th Cong., 1st Sess. 95-96 (1803) (instructions of Vermont and
request of Massachusetts); New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 88 (1883) (instructions
from Massachusetts to procure constitutional amendment in light of Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S.
(2 Dall.) 419 (1793)); Florida v. Georgia, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 478, 519-20 (1854) (Campbell, J.,
dissenting) (same; instructions of Virginia); infra notes 394-95 and accompanying text.
160 E.g., CONG. DEB., 23d Cong., 2d Sess. 262 (1835) (statement of Sen. Benton); ANNALS OF
CONG., 14th Cong., 2d Sess. 494 (1817) (statement of Rep. Robertson); LucE, supra note 99, at
466, 473 (examples of senators voting consistent with their instructions and against their own
announced views).
161 E.g., CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 805 (1858) (statement of Sen. Bell); ANNALS OF
CONG., 8th Cong., 1st Sess. 199 (1803) (statement of Sen. Plumer); see also ANNALS OF CONG.,
14th Cong., 2d Sess. 594 (1817) (statement of Rep. Pickering).
162 E.g., CONG. DEB., 23d Cong., 2d Sess. 256 (1835) (statement of Sen. Moore); id. at 722
(statement of Sen. Mangum) (instructions may require violation of U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3
requirement that the Senate keep a journal of its proceedings); ANNALS OF CONG., 8th Cong., 1st
Sess. 153-54 (1803) (statement of Sen. Plumer) (instructions to amend the Constitution violated
Article V); id. at 176-77 (statement of Sen. Tracy) (same); see ANNALS OF CONG., 14th Cong., 2d
Sess. 495 (1817) (statement of Rep. Clay); id. at 620 (statement of Rep. Tyjler).
163 E.g., CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 809-10 (1858) (statement of Sen. Bell).
164 E.g., LucE, supra note 99, at 463-68 (examples of John Quincy Adams and others who
resigned rather than follow instructions).
165 See Eaton, supra note 108, at 305-15; see also William E. Dodd, The Principle of In-
structing United States Senators, 1 S. ATLANTIc Q. 326 (1902).
166 CONG. DEB., 23d Cong., 1st Sess. 2062 (1834). Senator Bell filled the remaining nine
months of his term and was not re-elected.
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The bank affair involved two separate incidents. In order to cripple
the Bank, President Jackson had ordered the withdrawal of all U.S.
funds from it, an action which various state legislatures applauded or
condemned.167 Then, after the Senate ordered Jackson censured for
this act, several state legislatures ordered the censure expunged from
the Senate records. 168 In this controversial period, between 1834 and
1840, at least seven Southern senators resigned their offices rather
than accede to their instructions.169 Others boldly announced that
they would not follow the instructions and paid a heavy political price
for their noncompliance. 7 0
Not all senators who resisted their instructions paid such a price.
Particularly as the practice of instruction died out after the Civil War,
senators who refused their legislative patrons sometimes benefitted by
appearing statesmanlike and independent.171 After the war, the prac-
tice of instruction dwindled, though it did not die out completely. In-
deed, the practice survived until the adoption of the Seventeenth
Amendment.172 As an ultimate irony, the last recorded refusal to fol-
low legislative instructions was that of Senator Weldon Heyburn of
167 The incident helped propel Attorney General Roger Taney into the spotlight. Secretary
of the Treasury William Duane refused Jackson's order to remove the funds. Jackson fired him
and replaced him temporarily with Taney. When Jackson formally nominated Taney as Treasury
Secretary, the Senate rejected him. Later Jackson nominated him to the Court and, on the sec-
ond attempt, was successful. Tim SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: ILLUSTRATED BIOGRAPHIES,
1789-1993, at 118 (Clare Cushman ed., 1993).
168 E.g., CONG. DEB., 24th Cong, 1st Sess. 1021 (1836) (instructions of Ohio); CONG. DEB.,
23d Cong., 2d Sess. 253 (1835) (instructions of Alabama).
169 The roll call includes Senators Alexander Porter of Louisiana; Bedford Brown, Robert
Strange, and Willie Mangum of North Carolina; Hugh White of Tennessee; and William Rives
and John Tyler of Virginia. 2 GEORGE H. HAYNES, Tam SENATE OF TI-m UNiTED STATES 1025-
31 (1938) [hereinafter G. HAYNES, SENATE OF THm UNITED STATES]; KERR, supra note 36, at 83-
85; Dodd, supra note 165, at 327-29; Eaton, supra note 108, at 305-18; see also SANDSTROM, supra
note 85, at 166-68; LUCE, supra note 99, at 468-70; Riker, supra note 5, at 459 n.18.
170 Benjamin Leigh of Virginia, for example, announced that he would neither follow instruc-
tions nor resign. He in fact resigned within months, but cited health as his reason. 2 G. HAYNES,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 169, at 1028; Eaton, supra note 108, at 313-15.
171 "f\vo prominent senators who successfully refused their instructions were future Supreme
Court Justice Lucius Q.C. Lamar of Mississippi, see 32 CONG. REC 840 (1899); 7 CONG. REC.
1061 (1878); 2 G. HAYNES, SENATE OF am UNITED STATES, supra note 169, at 1029-30, and
Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, see KERR, supra note 36, at 85; see also 32 CONG. REc. 840
(1899).
172 See, e.g., ELECTION OF UNITED STATES SENATORS, H.R. REP. No. 88,56th Cong., 1st Sess.
2 (1900); S. REP. No. 530, 54th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1896) (noting that nine states had "instructed
in favor of this amendment"); 46 CONG. REC. 2770 (1911) (statement of Sen. Overman); 45
CONG. REc. 7111 (1910) (statement of Sen. Owen); id at 7113 (instructions of California), 7115
(instructions of Kansas), 7117 (instructions of North Carolina); 23 CONG. REC. 1267 (1892)
(statement of Sen. Palmer); 23 CONG. REc. 76 (1891) (statement of Sen. Turpie).
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Idaho, who refused to support the Seventeenth Amendment and dis-
enfranchise the body that elected him.173
2. Recall.-The second mechanism for demanding the account-
ability of senators was the right of recall. Recall was the means by
which states changed their representation in the Senate and enforced
their instructions.174 The mere threat of recall would help ensure that
delegates obtained and followed instructions, formally or informally
issued.
Although none of the states provided for recall in their own con-
stitutions,175 the Articles of Confederation had guaranteed state legis-
latures the power "to recall its delegates, or any of them, at any time
within the year, and to send others in their stead, for the remainder of
the year."'176 We have few records of anything said at the convention
concerning recall. The Founders voted to strike language that would
have made members of the House of Representatives "incapable of
re-election.., and subject to recall."'1 77 Apparently the delegates did
not even consider a right of recall of senators. Anti-Federalist Luther
Martin objected vigorously to this oversight:
the senate as constituted could not be a security for the protection and
preservation of the State governments, and that the senators could not bejustly considered the representatives of the States as States ... : for six
years the senators are rendered totally and absolutely independent of
their States, of whom they ought to be the representatives, without any
bond or tie between them: During that time they may join in measures
ruinous and destructive to their States, even such as should totally annihi-
late their State governments, and their States cannot recall them, nor exer-
cise any controul over them.178
New York was one of several ratifying conventions that debated
the omission of the recall power. The debates echo the themes of in-
dependence of senators versus accountability to their respective
states. Robert Livingston argued against the proposal179 as counter to
the Senate's stability. State legislatures "being frequently subject to
173 2 G. HAYNES, SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 169, at 1030; see 46 CONG. REC.
2768-69 (1911) (statement of Sen. Heyburn); 45 CONG. REC. 7113-14 (1910) (Idaho called for a
constitutional convention on the direct election of senators.).
174 Riker, supra note 5, at 456.
175 ADAMS, supra note 97. at 244.
176 ART. OF CONFED. art. V.
177 1 FARRAND, supra note 35, at 217.
178 Luther Martin, Genuine Information (1788), in 2 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra
note 75, at 213-14.
179 New York's proposal read:
Resolved, That no person shall be eligible as a senator for more than six years in any
term of twelve years, and that it shall be in the power of the legislatures of the several states
to recall their senators, or either of them, and to elect others in their stead, to serve for the
remainder of the time for which such senator or senators, so recalled, were appointed.
2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 72, at 289.
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factious and irregular passions" might appoint a senator on one day
and recall him the next, and all of this would be a "source of endless
confusion."18 0 The power of recall would "bind the senators too
strongly to the interests of their respective states," requiring a sacrifice
of the interests of the union to those of the state.'8' The threat of
recall was itself a potent power calculated to foster dependence; ac-
cording to Hamilton, senators "will be convinced that the surest
means of obtaining a reelection will be a uniform attachment to the
interests of their several states.' u82 For John Lansing, dependence was
precisely the object of recall; such would "induce [the senators] to pay
a constant regard to the good of their constituents.' u83 The recall pro-
posal would have vested the power with the state legislature because
popular recall was "impracticable"; there was "no regular way of col-
lecting the people's sentiments."' 8 4 By contrast, legislative recall was
"simple and easy. 185
In the Virginia debates, Patrick Henry argued that recall, or some
other method of discipline such as impeachment, was necessary to en-
force the right of instruction: "You may instruct [senators], and offer
your opinions; but if they think them improper, they may disregard
them.... Where, then, is the security?"' 8 6 George Nicholas, however,
thought the legislature had "sufficient security" and that "[t]he dread
of being recalled would impair their independence and firmness.' 18 7
In Massachusetts, others noted the lack of the right to recall.'88 And
in debates in New York, Rhode Island, and Pennsylvania, it was for-
mally urged that legislatures have the right to recall senators at any
time. 8 9
Neither the New York proposal nor subsequent recommenda-
tions survived. In 1808, following the failed impeachment of Justice
Samuel Chase, Virginia instructed its senators to obtain an amend-
ment "respecting the removal from office, by the vote of a majority of
the whole number of the members of the respective state legislatures,
180 Id. at 291; see also id. at 303 (statement of Alexander Hamilton) (stating that senators will
become "slave[s] to all the capricious humors among the people").
181 Id. at 296.
182 Id at 306 (statement of Alexander Hamilton). Hamilton noted that no state had ever
exercised the recall power under the Articles of Confederation. Id.
183 Id. at 293.
184 Id. at 294.
185 Id
186 3 ELUiOT'S DEBATES, supra note 72, at 355.
187 Id. at 360.
188 2 ELLIoT'S DEBATES, supra note 72, at 5 (statement of Dr. Taylor); id. at 47 (statement of
Col. Jones).
189 1 ELuoT's DEBATES, supra note 72, at 330 (New York); id. at 337 (Rhode Island); 2 id. at
545 (Pennsylvania).
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their Senators who have been, or may be appointed to Congress."19 0
Virginia's proposal found no support.
Without a formal means of recalling senators, states resorted to
other means of controlling their senators, largely through instruc-
tion. 191 But without a power of recall, the states lacked a means of
enforcing their instructions. The Founders' refusal to authorize recall
did not leave the states without any means of controlling their sena-
tors, but it left them without an effective means. Refusal to re-elect
was the formal mechanism provided by the Constitution, but it was
never as potent as the recall power. A senator who disregarded in-
structions or ignored the state's wishes might bank on persuading his
constituents of their error, hope for dimming memory, or wait out the
legislative elections and a change in personnel. 192
The Founders' unwillingness to have a right of recall reaffirmed
their commitment to the six-year term. Had the Constitution granted
states the recall power, then each succeeding legislature might select
its own delegate to the Senate, perhaps making the Senate as subject
to the winds of political change as the House. This would have under-
mined the Senate as a repository of wisdom and stability. On the
other hand, it surely lessened the role of the senators as representa-
tives of the state legislature and forced the legislators to give more
careful consideration to a senator assured of at least a six-year term.
3. Rotation in Office.-The third mechanism was rotation, or
what we would call term limits. Simply put, "rotation in office... [is]
an obligation on the holder of that office to go out at a certain pe-
riod."' 93 Rotation had a venerable provenance. Its origins owed to
Greek democratic thought, rotation was copied by the Romans,
adopted by Northern Italian city-states, and made popular in the sev-
enteenth and eighteenth centuries by Dutch and English theorists.194
This thought did not take hold in America until after the revolution of
190 SENATE JOURNAL, 10th Cong., 1st Sess. 267 (1807) (statement of Sen. Giles); see also
LUCE, supra note 99, at 490. An effort contemporaneous with the impeachment trial was simi-
larly dispatched. 14 ANNALS OF CONG., 8th Cong., 2d Sess. 1214-15 (1805); Colgrove, supra note
98, at X-47. Other examples are found in 2 G. HAYNES, SENATE OF Thm UNITED STATES, supra
note 169, at 1023-25.
191 See Eaton, supra note 108, at 315 (Alabama wished to recall Senator Moore and passed
resolutions requesting his resignation; Moore refused.); see also 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note
72, at 360 (statement of Wilson Nicholas) ("We cannot recall our senators. We can give them
instructions; and if they manifestly neglect our interest, we have sufficient security against them.
The dread of being recalled would impair their independence and firmness.").
192 Riker, supra note 5, at 457, 460.
193 Mark P. Petracca, Rotation in Office: The History of an Idea, in LIMING LEGISLATIVE
TERMs 19 (Gerald Benjamin & Michael J. Malbin eds., 1992) (quoting THE JEFFERSONIAN
CYCLOPEDIA 786 (John P. Foley ed., 1967)).
194 CARL RUSSELL FISH, THE CIVIL SERVICE AND THE PATRONAGE 80 (1905); Petracca, supra
note 193, at 19-27.
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1776. Although prior to that time, colonial laws specified limited
terms of office, "short terms of office had not prevented the recurrent
reelection of individuals, some of whom retained certain offices for
decades at a time, nor had it prevented the growth of dynasties that
laid claim to public offices." 195 The colonists had experience with un-
responsive administrators and addressed the problem in part by re-
quiring rotation in office.196 Rotation was something of an eighteenth
century equal protection clause. While general principles demanded
that the laws apply to everyone, rotation insisted that, in addition, a
larger number of people get an opportunity to make the laws. Rota-
tion prevented aristocracy from maintaining its position, and it pre-
vented those who would make themselves aristocrats from doing so
through public office.197 Although "[t]he theoretical defense of rota-
tion was based upon attachment to democracy[,] practical men de-
fended it by virtue of its value in winning elections."' 98
Nine of the new states' constitutions had some form of
mandatory rotation. Concerned with the abuse of power by their ex-
ecutives, most of those states limited the tenure of their governors.
Three states limited the tenure of state senators, one limited the ten-
ure of state representatives, and two restricted the tenure of their del-
egates to the Continental Congress.199 The new Americans thought
mandatory rotation an "important constitutional device[ ] for compel-
ling mobility in a deferential society where men too often feel obliged
to re[-]elect their rulers for fear of dishonoring them. '200 Rotation
was to the people and their representatives what separation of powers
was to the legislative and executive branches.201
195 ADAMS, supra note 97, at 251.
196 Id. at 243.
197 See WOOD, supra note 78, at 87.
198 LEONARD D. WmTE, Tan JACKSONIANS 317 (1954).
199 ADAMS, supra note 97, at 308-11. Only Maryland, New Hampshire, and North Carolina
mandated rotation of their delegates to Congress. MD. CoNST. OF 1776, art. XXVII, reprinted in
1 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 113, at 824; N.H. CONST. OF 1784, reprinted
in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTrTUrIONS, supra note 113, at 1291; N.C. CoNS-r. OF 1776, art.
XXXVII, reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CoNSTITUTiONS, supra note 113, at 1414.
200 WOOD, supra note 78,'at 140.
201 The connection was explicit in Virginia:
That the legislative and executive powers of the State should be separate and distinct from
the judiciary-, and that the members of the two first may be restrained from oppression, by
feeling and participating the burdens of the people, they should, at fixed periods, be reduced
to a private station, return into that body from which they were originally taken, and the
vacancies be supplied by frequent, certain, and regular elections, in which all, or any part of
the former members, to be again eligible, or ineligible, as the laws shall direct.
VA. BiLL OF Riorrs § 5 (1776), reprinted in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONsTrruTiONS, supra note
113, at 1909; see also MASS CONST. OF 1780, part 1, art. VIII, reprinted in 1 FEDERAL AND STATE
CONsTrrutnoNs, supra note 113, at 958.
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The principle of rotation found its way into the Articles of Con-
federation,202 but the principle as a formal legal constraint did not sur-
vive the Constitutional Convention. The convention, without
discussion, first struck a proposal making representatives "incapable
of re-election into 1st. branch for [ ] years and subject to recall. '203 In
the subsequent debates over senators' terms, James Wilson argued
that "9 years [terms] with a rotation" would provide "stability or effi-
cacy [in] our Government. '20 4 Apparently, the delegates assumed
that because senatorial terms were longer than representatives' terms,
mandatory rotation was unnecessary.205 For example, although
Madison did not expressly mention rotation, he hoped that states
would send senators of sufficient age and experience that they would
naturally not seek re-election.206
Rotation was, however, the subject of debates in ratifying con-
ventions in New York, Massachusetts, South Carolina, and Virginia.
In Massachusetts, Major Kingsley pointed out that under the Articles
of Confederation the people had "three checks on their delegates in
Congress-the annual election of them, their rotation, and the power
to recall. '20 7
In June 1788, the New York ratifying convention saw the most
extensive and spirited debate between Federalists and Anti-Federal-
ists over the question of rotation.208 Melancton Smith explained that
formal rotation was needed because "[a]s the clause now stands, there
is no doubt that senators will hold their office perpetually. '209 Gilbert
Livingston proposed that New York recommend as an amendment to
the Constitution: "Resolved, That no person shall be eligible as a sen-
ator for more than six years in any term of twelve years .... -"210 Liv-
ingston reasoned that without this constraint senators would have a
"security of their reelection, as long as they please."' 211 Not only
would rotation be good for senators, who are "apt to forget their de-
pendence," but the presence of senators-turned-citizens would "dif-
fus[e] a more general knowledge of the measures and spirit of the
202 ART. OF CONFED. art. V ("[N]o person shall be capable of being a delegate for more than
three years in any term of six years.").
203 1 FARRAND, supra note 35, at 217.
204 1 FARRAND. supra note 35, at 426.
205 Petracca, supra note 193, at 31.
206 1 FARRAND, supra note 35, at 423.
207 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 72, at 61-62, 63.
208 See Petracca, supra note 193, at 31; Erik H. Corwin, Note, Limits on Legislative Terms:
Legal and Policy Implications, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 569, 582-86 (1991). See generally Michael
J. Malbin, Federalists v. Antifederalists: The Term-Limitation Debate at the Founding, in LiMrrINo
LEGISLATIVE TERMS 53 (Gerald Benjamin & Michael J. Malbin eds., 1992) (discussing the de-
bates over rotation).
209 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 72, at 309.
210 Id. at 289.
211 Id. at 287.
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administration"; citizens will "feel more forcibly that the government
is of their own choice," and as new senators are elected, "they will
consider their interest as the same with those of their constituents, and
that they legislate for themselves as well as others. '212 Anti-Federalist
Johii Lansing added that the best means of securing representation of
the people was to "oblig[e] our rulers, at certain periods, to relinquish
their offices and rank. The people cannot be represented by men who
are perpetually separated from them. '213 Melancton Smith suggested
that Congress "would undoubtedly have suffered all the evils of fac-
tion, had it not been secured by the rotation established by the Arti-
cles of Confederation. . . .[R]otation in the government is a very
important and truly republican institution. '214
The Federalists argued vigorously that rotation would not im-
prove representation of the people. Most obviously, rotation limited
the people's choices, their "natural rights": "The people are the best
judges who ought to represent them. '215 Rotation, they claimed, actu-
ally limited senators' accountability. Senators who must depend on
state legislatures for re-election will respond to their wishes; con-
versely, a senator who "knows that no meritorious exertions of his
own can procure a reappointment.., will become more unambitious,
regardless of the public opinion. '216
Alexander Hamilton argued equally vigorously against the reso-
lution and defended the six-year senate term. Notably, he opposed
rotation as a formal requirement, but suggested that rotation in the
Senate would in fact occur. "[TIhe main design of the Convention, in
forming the Senate, was to prevent fluctuations and cabals.... The
senators are to serve six years.... One third of the members are to go
out every two years; and in six, the whole body will be changed." 217
Hamilton also reminded the Convention that because state legisla-
tures elected senators, that rotation in state legislatures would bring
about rapid changes in the composition of the Senate: "As the state
legislatures are in continual fluctuation, the senator will have more
attachments to form, and consequently a greater difficulty of main-
taining his place .... ",218 He added that the Senate would see "a
constant and frequent change of members," and thus "[a]ny scheme of
usurpation will lose, every two years, a number of its oldest advocates,
212 Id. at 288.
213 Id. at 294.
214 Id. at 310.
215 Id. at 292 (statement of Robert R. Livingston).
216 I& at 298 (statement of Richard Harrison).
217 Id. at 305.
218 Id. at 306.
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and their places will be supplied by an equal number of new, unac-
commodating, and virtuous men. '219
The Federalists were probably correct that "lame duck" senators
owed no fealty to their constituents, but the cure was either life ten-
ure, as Hamilton had advocated unsuccessfully at the Constitutional
Convention, or instruction of senators, as the northeastern and south-
ern states practiced. Life tenure cures the lame duck syndrome but, as
Hamilton would have known, would do nothing to make senators re-
sponsive to their constituents. As to the claim that mandatory rota-
tion limited voters' choices, Melancton Smith properly pointed out
that all government was a restraint on the "natural rights" of the peo-
ple. The people's best choices might be excluded by such a restriction,
but only rarely might they thereby "sustain any material loss. ' 220 New
York nevertheless rejected Livingston's proposed amendment.
The idea of formal rotation has re-emerged on several occasions
since the framing of the Constitution.221 George Washington, Thomas
Jefferson, and Andrew Jackson supported the notion as well. 222 The
notion stumbled during the Civil War when the situation required sta-
bility in office.22 3 By the turn of the century, the culture of profession-
alism made it acceptable for members of Congress to make a career
out of service. By contrast, state legislatures continued to turn
over.224 Rotation was mentioned during debates on the Twenty-Sec-
ond Amendment, and one proposal would have limited senators and
representatives to a six year tenure.225 Presidents Truman, Eisen-
hower, and Bush have since endorsed some form of mandatory rota-
tion in office.226
Federalists and others assumed that senators would rotate out of
office even without a constitutional provision. Rotation was ingrained
in the philosophy of the day.227 In fact, there was a great deal of turn-
over in the early Senate, but not necessarily because of rotation. Fully
half of the senators elected between 1789 and 1793 failed to serve a
219 Id. at 319; see also Corwin, supra note 208, at 601-02 (commenting on term limits and lame
ducks).
220 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 72, at 311.
221 E.g., ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 120, at 761 (Aug. 18, 1789) (proposal of Thomas
Icker).
222 Andrew Jackson, First Annual Message, in 3 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS
1011-12 (James D. Richardson ed., New York, Bureau of National Literature, Inc. 1897); Pe-
tracca, supra note 193, at 35-36.
223 Petracca, supra note 193, at 39-40; Richardson, supra note 48, at 5.
224 Petracca, supra note 193, at 41-42.
225 Senator O'Daniel sponsored the amendment as a substitute for the proposed Twenty-Sec-
ond Amendment. The substitute failed 82 to 1. 93 CONG. REc. 1962-63 (1947).
226 Presidential Debate, 1992-93 PuB. PAPERS 1830 (Oct. 15, 1992) (endorsement by George
Bush); Richardson, supra note 48, at 8.
227 Petracca, supra note 193, at 30-31.
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full term, most through resignation.228 The informal practice of rota-
tion waned after the Civil War and finally disappeared.229 Senators,
like their House counterparts, viewed political office as a career possi-
bility, and their ambition prevented them from accepting lower public
office, as had been common earlier.23 0
D. The Consequences of Structure
The structure of the Senate in the original Constitution influ-
enced the way in which it and other institutions behaved. Each of the
institutions most concerned with the selection and control of sena-
tors-the people, the state legislatures, and the senators themselves-
had a distinct interest. The people, naturally, cared most about laws
that affected them, irrespective of whether the laws were state or fed-
eral. People were interested in securing laws that benefitted them and
minimizing laws that harmed them. Because of the limitations of di-
rect government, people were interested in electing state and federal
representatives who could strike the proper balance.
By contrast, state legislatures maximized their own positions or
spheres of influence by obtaining benefits for, and minimizing harms
to, their constituents, and by getting themselves re-elected. The for-
mer was secured directly by the laws enacted by the state legislature
and was secured indirectly through the laws enacted by Congress, one
house of which was elected by the legislatures. The legislature had an
interest in the laws it enacted and in the senators it elected, since it
bore direct responsibility for both. State legislatures understood that
when Congress preempted or otherwise made state laws ineffective,
the state legislatures became less relevant in their lawmaking capacity
and more relevant in their role as regulators of the state's senators.
When state legislatures lost all control over their senators through the
Seventeenth Amendment, they became virtually irrelevant to the pro-
cess of monitoring federal legislation through the state's senators. In
subsequent years, as Congress preempted more and more state legis-
lation, state legislatures were powerless to prevent their slide into
ignominy.
Senators similarly were concerned with enacting laws benefitting
their constituents and getting re-elected. Politics, like nature, ab-
horred a vacuum, so senators felt the pressure to do something,
namely enact laws. 23 1 Once senators were no longer accountable to
228 ALAN I. ABRAMOWITZ & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, SENATE ELECTIONS 14 (1992).
229 In the House, rotation was honored prior to the Civil War in regions other than the South.
The Southern states rotated state offices, but not federal offices, recognizing that seniority in
Congress protected Southern interests. Samuel Kernell, Toward Understanding 19th Century
Congressional Careers: Ambition, Competition, and Rotation, 21 AM. J. POL. Sci. 669, 676 (1977).
230 Id. at 691.
231 See BARBARA SINCLAIR, THm TRANSFORMATION OF THE U.S. SENATE 144-45 (1989).
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and constrained by state legislatures, the maximizing function for sen-
ators was unrestrained; senators almost always found it in their own
interest to procure federal legislation, even to the detriment of state
control of traditional state functions.
The original structure of the Senate left state legislatures in a dif-
ficult position. The lack of formal rotation suggested the possibility of
a more permanent institution in Congress. The states' inability to re-
call senators, together with the loss of the power of instruction, limited
the influence state legislatures had over the Senate. If state legisla-
tures could not make senators accountable in any unique way, there
was little reason to have senators elected by state legislatures. And as
senators became less accountable and state legislatures less demand-
ing or vigilant, the states as political entities ceased to be represented
in the Senate. In many respects, the Seventeenth Amendment was an
acknowledgement of the legislatures' failed control over senators.
III. "DIRECT REPUBLICANISM": 2 32 THE ADoPTION OF THE
SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT
A. Early Proposals for Direct Election
As early as 1826, Representative Storrs proposed amending the
Constitution to provide for popular election of senators.233 Similar
amendments were proposed between 1829 and 1855.234 The most
prominent proposal came in 1868 in correspondence and speeches by
President Andrew Johnson, who thought the merit of direct election
"so palpable" that it did not require further explication.235
In 1866, Congress enacted, for the only time in its history, an act
pursuant to its power to alter the "Tmes, Places and Manner of hold-
ing Elections for Senators. '236 In December 1865, the New Jersey leg-
islature elected John Stockton to the Senate, but with only 40 of 81
votes, a plurality.237 Although the Constitution did not specify that
the legislature elect by majority vote, the Senate voted to exclude
Stockton and then adopted an act requiring, among other things, that
state legislatures, meeting if necessary in joint assembly, had to elect
232 Bresler, supra note 100, at 358.
233 2 CONo. DEB. 1348-49 (1826); see 5 CONG. DEB. 362 (1829) (statement of Rep. Wright)
(proposing that senators be elected "in such manner as the [L]egislatures thereof may
prescribe").
234 G. HAYNES, ELECTION OF SENATORS, supra note 33, at 101-03.
235 Andrew Johnson, Correspondence (July 18, 1868), in 9 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS, supra note 222, at 3840-41; see also Andrew Johnson, Fourth Annual Message (Dec.
9, 1868), in MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF rH PRESIDENTS, supra note 222 at 3889.
236 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
237 Although 41 of 81 legislators voted for someone other than Stockton, they divided their
votes among five candidates (although one received 37 votes). See CoMPILATION OF SENATE
ELECTION CASES FROM 1789 TO 1913, S. Doc. No. 1036, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. 324 (1913).
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senators by majority vote.23 8 Congress obviously regarded the issue as
an important one, because it commenced debate in March 1866 and
passed the bill in July 1866, a time which coincides precisely with the
drafting, debates, and passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the
Fourteenth Amendment.23 9 The bill would play an important, but
overlooked role in the impetus to the Seventeenth Amendment.
By the 1890s, the movement for popular election had gained
strength. Its proponents pushed popular election on two fronts. First,
a number of states provided for "elections" for United States sena-
tors.240 The results were merely advisory to the legislatures, but two
states required that their state legislators indicate whether they would
follow the straw votes.24 1 These nonbinding primaries were, in es-
sence, referenda instructing state legislators.242 Second, the states
sought passage of a constitutional amendment. The proposal was sol-
idly supported in the House,243 but, at least initially, poorly supported
in the Senate. Surprisingly, the bodies that stood to lose power if the
amendment passed-state legislatures-were quite supportive. In-
deed, by 1910 a majority of the states had indicated to Congress that
they favored a constitutional amendment.244 The wake-up call to the
Senate was apparently the defeat in 1910 of ten Republican senators
238 Act of July 25, 1866, 14 Stat. 243, repealed sub silentio by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. See
G. HAYNES, ELECrTON OF SENATORS, supra note 33, at 22-30. Under the Act each house of the
state legislature should meet and give a recorded vote. If both houses had elected the same
person, he was declared senator. If not, the houses were to convene together and a senator
elected by majority of the joint assembly. In the event the joint assembly could not elect a
senator, the assembly "shall meet at twelve o'clock, meridian, of each succeeding day during the
session of the legislature, and take at least one vote until a senator shall be elected." 14 Stat. at
243; see also 1 G. HAYNES, SENATE OF TIM UNITED STATES, supra note 169, at 81-85; KERR,
supra note 36, at 15.
239 The Republican Senate's expulsion of Stockton, a Democrat, occurred just before it voted
to overturn Andrew Johnson's veto of the Civil Rights Act. Stockton's expulsion
"[u]nderscor[ed] the intensity of Republican feeling" and helped prevent the sustaining of the
veto. ERIc FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at 250
(1988); see HORACE EDGAR FLACK, THm ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 36, 38-
39 (1908).
240 See, e.g., ABSTRACT OF LAWS RELATING TO Tma ELECTION OF UNITED STATES SENATORS,
S. Doc No. 393, 59th Cong., 2d Sess. (1907); see also Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232,
265-66 (1921) (White, CJ., concurring); Daynes, Direct Election, supra note 34, at 13.
241 1 G. HAYNES, SENATE OF TmE UNITED STATES, supra note 169, at 100-04.
242 46 CONo. REC. 2774 (1911) (statement of Sen. Borah); see ROBERT RIENOW & LEONA
TRAIN RiENow, OF SNUFF, SIN AND Tm SENATE 291-92 (1965) (recounting how Republican
legislators in Oregon first pledged to follow the straw votes and, when the people chose an
idiosyncratic Democrat, then appealed to President Roosevelt to absolve them of their pledge;
Roosevelt refused).
243 The House had good reason to support the amendment. Popularly elected senators repre-
sented the same constituency (albeit more numerous) as popularly elected representatives.
States (through their legislators) could block populist proposals coming out of the House. With-
out the influence of state legislatures, the House stood to gain power in Congress.
244 HOEBEKE, supra note 34, at 149; see 45 CONo. REQ 7113-20 (1910).
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who had opposed the proposed amendment. 245 Western states were
more receptive to the changes, finding that direct democracy served
their ends.246 The North Atlantic states, in particular, opposed direct
election. 247
B. Motivation for the Seventeenth Amendment
The Populist movement of the 1890s and the Progressive move-
ment of the early 1900s brought powerful support for what would be-
come the Seventeenth Amendment.248 National figures such as
William Jennings Bryan argued forcefully for reform, while opponents
of direct election counted among their members powerful and vener-
able figures, including Senators Elihu Root of New York, George
Hoar of Massachusetts, and George Edmunds of Vermont. Root be-
lieved so passionately in the folly of amending the Constitution in this
way that he refused to stand for popular election after passage of the
amendment.249
The stated justifications for the Seventeenth Amendment were
corruption in state legislatures, deadlock in elections of U.S. senators,
and renewed faith in the competence of people to make their own
choices for senators. For the most part, federalism, or accountability
of senators to states, was not only not an issue, it was studiously
avoided by the amendment's proponents. As one commentator has
stated, "It is difficult to understand how even the progressive propa-
gandists imagined that depriving legislatures of their only control over
national affairs would strengthen houses that were already decadent
for want of a significant agenda. '25 0 But as we will see, the embarrass-
ing silence is the best evidence that the people either believed them-
selves as capable as their legislatures at protecting the interests of
federalism or simply preferred democracy to representation and were
willing to shoulder the loss to constitutional federalism.
1. The Corruption of State Legislatures. -By the early 1890s, as
the reform movement gained momentum, there was a general percep-
tion that senatorial elections had been bought and sold, that "men
245 Daynes, Direct Election, supra note 34, at 9; Larry J. Easterling, Sen. Joseph L. Bristow
and the Seventeenth Amendment, 41 KAN. HisT. Q. 488, 503 (1975).
246 Zywicki, supra note 34, at 1043-44 (Western states sought seniority in Senate.).
247 G. HAYNES, ELECTION OF SENATORS, supra note 33, at 107-10. It would be overgeneraliz-
ing, however, to characterize the debate over the Seventeenth Amendment as one between
Democrats and Republicans. The Democrats were quick to embrace it, but Western Republi-
cans were strong supporters of the reform. Southern Democrats feared an erosion of their do-
minion through the seniority system. ALAN P. GRIMES, DEMOCRACY AND THE AMENDMENTS
TO TIE CONsTrruTON 82, 161 (1978); Zywicki, supra note 34, at 1043-44.
248 ABRAMOwiTZ & SEGAL, supra note 228, at 16.
249 2 PHLLip C. Jassup, EuLHu ROOT 242 (1964).
250 Riker, supra note 5, at 468.
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have gained seats in the Senate of the United States whom the people
of their State would never have chosen to go there, and who never
would have gone there but [f]or the corrupt use of money to secure
their election." 251 Whatever the general impressions, members of
Congress cited very few specifics in support of their claims of bribery
and corruption.25 2 One representative adverted to the "facts as exper-
ienced by many States of this Union, and by some more than once,"
but referred only to an incident in Kansas in 1873 in which a member
of the state legislature received $7000 to secure his vote and later re-
turned the money.25 3 Complaints about political "tricks" in Illinois
turned out to be nothing more than a Republican get-out-the-vote ef-
fort that caught Democrats in a Democratic district by surprise.254
Despite the dearth of hard information on the floor of the House
and Senate chambers, some evidence indicated that state legislators
had sold their votes.25 5 Between 1857 and 1900, the Senate investi-
gated ten cases of alleged bribery or corruption, although in only
three cases was a Senate committee able to conclude that the charges
had merit.25 6 In 1900, for example, Senator William Clark resigned
after a Senate committee reported that Clark had purchased eight of
his fifteen votes in the Montana legislature; Montana returned Sena-
tor Clark the following year.25 7 Apparently other investigated inci-
dents contributed to the overall impression of corruption. For
example, in 1907, Senator Guggenheim revealed that he had contrib-
uted so much to Republican legislators' campaign funds that he cov-
ered their expenses. 25 8
Aside from their charges of direct corruption, progressive and
populist members took aim at two other targets: machine politics and
corporations. Senator Palmer claimed that elections in the Illinois leg-
islature were contests between two party machines. Only if "the peo-
ple had the right and power to choose a Senator... would [there] be
251 23 CoNG. REQ 6066 (1892) (statement of Rep. Bushnell); see id. at 6071 (statement of
Rep. Lanham); see also 31 CoNG. REcQ 4810 (1898) (statement of Rep. Corliss) ("[I]t is as diffi-
cult for a poor man to enter the Senate of the United States as for a rich man to enter the
kingdom of heaven.").
Some members also complained that state legislators' votes were purchased by federal pa-
tronage. 23 CONo. REc 1270 (1892) (statement of Sen. Palmer); id. at 6068 (statement of Rep.
Gantz); see also KEmP, supra note 36, at 20.
252 Members may have been reluctant to accuse sitting Senators publicly.
253 23 CONG. REQ 6075 (1892) (statement of Rep. Kem).
254 23 CoNG. REQ 3201 (statement of Sen. Palmer); id at 6079 (statement of Rep. Scott).
255 KERR, supra note 36, at 19-20 (Rhode Island and New York).
256 G. HAYNEs, ELECrTON OF SENATORS, supra note 33, at 53-56. George Haynes also pro-
vided examples from Alabama, Arkansas, California, Montana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Utah.
But as Haynes noted, the committees' conclusion of lack of evidence did not exonerate the
members accused, and the Senate failed to investigate other, more serious, allegations.
257 ld. at 56.
258 GEORGE E. MowRY, THE EPA oF THEODORE ROOsEVELT, 1900-1912, at 264 (1958).
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some possibility of resisting and even overthrowing both those ma-
chines. '' 259 In a similar vein, William Jennings Bryan argued that
"great corporations.., are able to compass the election for their tools
and their agents through the instrumentality of Legislatures, as they
could not if Senators were elected directly by the people. '260
Opponents of direct election of senators questioned the bribery
and corruption rationale on several levels. They questioned whether
the problem was sufficiently serious to merit a constitutional amend-
ment.261 Others asked whether the proponents had any assurances
that corrupting influences would not corrupt popular elections as
well.262 Noting that most states would nominate senators through a
convention, opponents argued that machine politics would "corrupt[]
a convention as easily as a Legislature. '263
Perhaps the most thoughtful opponent of direct election reform
was New York Senator Elihu Root. Admitting that there were "ru-
mors, suspicions, and occasionally proofs of corrupt conduct on the
part of State legislatures," he questioned whether there was any
"claim ... that the wise men who framed our Constitution were mis-
taken in their belief that wise and intelligent and faithful State legisla-
tures would make the best possible choice for Senators of the United
States. ' 264 Given these "exceptional and occasional cases," he asked,
why "abandon ... rather than reform the system," when the "whole
proposition rests upon the postulate of the incapacity of the people of
the United States to elect honest and faithful legislatures[?] ' 265
Root's point was well taken. The proponents of the Amendment had
brought forth evidence of corruption, but they had failed to show that
it resulted from the structure of the present mode of election and that
structural change in the mode of election would cure the problem. If
the people had proven so notoriously inept in electing state legislators,
what made us think they would prove more capable of electing U.S.
259 28 CONG. REc. 6735 (1896). In fact, in 1912, the Senate expelled Illinois Senator William
Lorimer for having been elected corruptly. It was poor timing for a Senate opposed to direct
election, although the vote to expel Lorimer crossed the lines of supporters and opponents of
direct election. HOEBEKE, supra note 34, at 92-93.
260 26 CONG. REC. 7775 (1894); see 28 CONG. REc. 1520 (1896) (statement of Sen. Turpie); 23
CONG. Rac. 3194 (1892) (statement of Sen. Chandler); id. at 6063 (statement of Rep. Tucker); id.
at 6068 (statement of Rep. Gantz).
261 46 CONG. REC. 2771 (1911) (statement of Sen. Heyburn).
262 35 CONG. REC. 2618 (1902) (statement of Sen. Stewart); 25 CONG. Rac. 105 (1893) (state-
ment of Sen. Hoar).
263 23 CONG. REc. 6076 (1892) (statement of Rep. Dungan); see also S. REP. No. 794 (Part 1),
52d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1892); 28 CONG. REC. 6735 (1896) (statement of Sen. Palmer); 25 CONG.
REC. 102-03 (1893) (statement of Sen. Hoar).
264 46 CONG. REc. 2242 (1911).
265 Id.; see also 23 CONG. REc. 6076 (1892) (statement of Rep. Dungan) ("[T]o amend our
Federal Constitution this wise, is to distrust the capacity of the people for wise and honest selec-
tion of members of the Legislature.").
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senators? What populism was there to the cynicism with which. popu-
larly-elected state legislatures were viewed?
Moreover, the proponents of the Amendment had perhaps over-
looked that state-wide races conducted to the electorate rather than to
the legislature would prove far more expensive than congressional
races or the then current senate races, and the need for money could
only encourage the influence of corporations and political machines.
If the proponents' real concern was eliminating corporate influence,
the Amendment may have only facilitated the influence.266 The pro-
ponents thought that corporations would have less influence with the
electorate than with the legislature, but direct election turned the cor-
porations' attention from the legislature to the candidates themselves,
lowering the costs of securing influence.267 As senators refocused on a
mass electorate rather than a relatively small group of legislators, they
became amenable to the influence of powerful lobbies. The Seven-
teenth Amendment reduced the cost of lobbying by eliminating the
state legislatures as a countervailing source of control over U.S. sena-
tors. Direct election enabled lobbyists to focus directly on the sena-
tors rather than on the entire state legislature.268
Whatever the level of discourse at which state legislators and sen-
ators had conducted their mutual business, the Seventeenth Amend-
ment ensured that future discourse would be conducted at a more
general level. The Seventeenth Amendment guaranteed the ascen-
dancy of a different kind of senator: one whose primary skills are
dealing with the masses through public appearances, mailings, and
sound bites.269
2. Deadlock and Delay in the Election of Senators.-A second
ground for demanding direct election was the delay and deadlock in
the actual election of senators.270 Often senators-elect failed to obtain
their seats due to technicalities. 271 From time to time, state legisla-
tures could not agree on a candidate and delayed sending a represen-
266 Zywicki, supra note 34, at 1012 (stating that the Seventeenth Amendment "eliminated
institutional arrangements which restrained special-interest groups' use of the federal govern-
ment as a tool for wealth distribution"); see HOEBEKE, supra note 34, at 5 ("[M]ass democracy
cannot even claim to promote the will of the majority so much as the agenda of those who can
organize and raise money for various private and local interests.").
267 Daynes, Direct Election, supra note 34, at 58.
268 Zywicki, supra note 34, at 1040; see also Vik D. Amar, Note, The Senate and the Constitu-
tion, 97 YALE L.J. 1111, 1129 (1988) ("By requiring Senatorial candidates to raise large amounts
of money to campaign for many votes, the Seventeenth Amendment may facilitate private inter-
est group access to the federal government.").
269 Daynes, Direct Election, supra note 34, at 74-81.
270 E.g., S. REP. No. 530, supra note 172, at 6-7; S. REP. No. 794 (Part 2), 52d Cong., 1st Sess.
7 (1892).
271 These cases are collected in COMPILATION OF SENATE ELECTION CASES, supra note 237.
See also 33 CONG. REc. 4121 (1900) (statement of Rep. Ryan).
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tative to Washington. In some extreme cases, states proved so
intransigent they failed to send anyone at all. 272 As support for direct
election swelled, state legislatures proved particularly inept. Between
1891 and 1905, eight state legislatures failed to elect senators and were
without full representation from periods of ten months to four
years.273 Delaware presented the most extreme case, failing to send
senators in 1895, 1899, 1901, and 1905. One of Delaware's seats went
unfilled from March 1899 to March 1903, and between 1901 and 1903,
Delaware failed to send any senators to Washington. In 1895 the Del-
aware legislature deadlocked for 114 days, recording some 217 ballots,
and still failed to elect a senator. In 1897, apparently in anticipation of
a dispute over an open senate seat, one-third of the Oregon legislature
refused to take the oath of office. The legislature met for some 53
days without convening; it disbanded having failed to elect a senator,
or to take legislative action of any kind.274
For the proponents of direct election, this intransigence was un-
thinkable. It emphasized "a very clear incongruity between legislative
duties and the office of choosing Senators of the United States." 275
The mode of election "divert[ed] the attention of legislators from mat-
ters of legislation"276 and threatened "total neglect" by state legisla-
tors. The failure of states to elect was "not a physical disability; it
[was] rather a political or functional inability induced by the too close
equilibrium of dissenting forces which are unable to unite upon a
Problems apparently began with the First Congress, when the New York legislature ad-
journed without electing senators. SANDSTROM, supra note 85, at 29.
272 See 1 G. HAYNES, SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 169, at 86-88.
273 The states were California, Delaware, Montana, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, Washington,
and Wyoming. Data on the elections are taken from CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, GUIDE TO
U.S. ELECTIONS (2d ed. 1985) [hereinafter GUIDE TO U.S. ELECTIONS]. See also 31 CONG. REC.
4819 (1898) (statement of Sen. Tongue); 30 CONG. REC. 171 (1897) (statement of Sen. Thrpie); 28
CONG REC. 1521 (1896) (statement of Sen. Turpie); id. at 6729-30 (statement of Sen. Perkins); G.
HAYNES, ELECTION OF SENATORS, supra note 33, at 38-39.
274 31 CONG. REC. 4820-21 (1898) (statement of Sen. Tongue); 30 CONG. RE. 171 (1897)
(statement of Sen. T"lrpie); see also G. HAYNES, ELECION OF SENATORS, supra note 33, at 193-
95.
275 30 CONG. REC. 171 (1897) (statement of Sen. Tbrpie).
276 28 CONG. REC. 6728 (1896) (statement of Sen. Mitchell). Senator John H. Mitchell of
Oregon was a vigorous advocate of direct election of Senators. See 23 CONG. REC. 1270 (1892)
(statement of Sen. Mitchell) (Mitchell introduced proposed amendment in 1888 and 1890). He
was himself the source of a great deal of controversy, and one wonders whether he would have
survived a popular vote. Mitchell (which was not his real name) was a bigamist and an adulterer.
He was notable for another reason. In 1866 he sued his former client, Marcus Neff, for $253.14
plus costs, serving him by publication. When Neff failed to show, Mitchell had Neff's property in
Oregon seized and sold at auction, which Mitchell himself purchased. Mitchell turned around
and sold the property to his friend and future Oregon Governor, Sylvester Pennoyer. The result-
ing suit was, of course, Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). In 1905, Senator Mitchell was
convicted of land fraud and died, in office, while his appeal was pending. The story has been
wonderfully preserved in Wendy Collins Perdue, Sin, Scandal and Substantive Due Process: Per-
sonal Jurisdiction and Pennoyer Reconsidered, 62 WASH. L. REV. 479 (1987).
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choice. '277 As one representative put it: "The framers of our Consti-
tution did not intend to permit vacancies to exist in the Senate."278
Moreover, there was a general sense that the election of U.S. sen-
ators had overwhelmed local issues, that state legislators were often
selected for the purpose of choosing a U.S. senator.279 Some Senate
elections became so important, they dominated the local elections.
One late-nineteenth century treatise observed that people chose their
state legislators "with especial reference to electing United States
senators."280
Legislative deadlocks presented a persuasive argument for those
favoring direct election, and if state legislatures had any reservations
about giving up their power to elect U.S. senators, their failure to ex-
ercise the power could not have come at a worse time.2 81 Here was a
serious threat to democratic and republican ideals. Misrepresenta-
tion, through corruption or malfeasance, might be cured at the polls,
but nonrepresentation was denial of a state's franchise and worse than
misrepresentation.
The opponents of direct election, however, argued convincingly
that legislative deadlocks were not the inevitable result of legislative
election. The real problem, they said, was the Act of July 25, 1866.
Senator William Stewart of Nevada, who had been a member of the
Senate Judiciary Committee that considered the 1866 Act, argued that
the purpose for the Act was to forestall one house from refusing to
meet with the other house, thereby preventing election. "The method
now in vogue to prevent an election is the failure of any candidate to
secure a majority." For Senator Root, "deadlock [and] ... inexplic-
able delay.., constitute the chief reason for the assent of the people
to propositions to change the manner of election." 283 As Root
pointed out, amending the 1866 law to permit election by plurality
would eliminate the deadlocks. If securing election through majority
vote was the end of the proposed constitutional amendment, it was
destined to failure. "In every close State the outlying parties, the ir-
reconcilable, not occasionally or accidentally, but as a rule, poll more
votes than the difference between the two great parties, and that
277 30 CONo. Rc. 171 (1897) (statement of Sen. Turpie).
278 33 CONo. REC. 4110 (1900) (statement of Rep. Corliss).
279 See 30 CONG. REc. 4810 (1898) (statement of Rep. Corliss).
280 ANNA LAURENS DAWES, How WE ARE GOVERNED 85 (1885); see also John Haynes, Pop-
ular Election of United States Senators, In 11 JoiiNs HoPKINs U. STUD. iN HisT. & PoL. Sci. 99-
100 (Hebert B. Adams ed., 1893) [hereinafter Haynes, Popular Election].
281 The Oregon legislature so afflicted itself with deadlocks that it finally capitulated. In the
next session, the legislature, after it failed to convene to elect a senator, adopted a resolution
calling for the direct election of senators. G. HAYNES, E.EcrON OF SENATORS, supra note 33, at
194-95.
282 35 CONG. REc. 2617 (1902).
283 46 CONG. RaE 2242 (1911).
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means that, as a rule, in the close States of the Union no one is elected
by a majority vote. '284 If a majority rule of election was a good in and
of itself, direct election of senators virtually assured that senators in
close elections would not be elected by a majority.285
3. Populist Sentiment.-As Root and others demonstrated,
while corruption and legislative deadlock might have demanded re-
form, neither justified amending the Constitution. These problems re-
quired attention, but far less drastic reform measures were available.
Thus, neither served as an adequate explanation for the Seventeenth
Amendment.
In the end analysis, the superficial appeal of election reform
aside, the real justification for the Seventeenth Amendment was its
populist appeal, a need to "awaken[ ] in the Senators... a more acute
sense of responsibility to the people. '28 6 The people simply wished to
elect senators themselves, without the mediation of their state repre-
sentatives. William Jennings Bryan argued that "[i]f the people of a
State have enough intelligence to choose their representatives in the
State legislature.., they have enough intelligence to choose the men
who shall represent them in the United States Senate. '28 7 Whatever
the reasons for the original mode of selection, the voters were "a new
people living and acting under an old system. s288 In the proponents'
view, the Senate had been "a sort of aristocratic body-too far re-
moved from the people, beyond their reach, and with no especial in-
terest in their welfare. '28 9 For populists and progressives, election by
the legislature was an anachronism:
To whom, we ask, is a Senator now answerable for his conduct? To the
legislature? This body changes three times during his service. A Sena-
tor elected to-day for six years by a legislature comes back in six years
seeking reelection before another legislature composed of almost en-
tirely new men. His pledges to the body that elected him are nudum
pactum to the legislature, which was not a party to the contract of his
service or to his pledges. 290
284 Id.; see also 25 CONG. REc. 106 (1893) (statement of Sen. Hoar) ("plurality must take the
place of the majority").
285 Some proponents recognized that a plurality of voters would elect senators. 28 CoNo.
REc. 1521 (1896) (statement of Sen. Thrpie).
286 Election of Senators, H.R. REP. No. 1456, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1898); see also S. REP.
No. 530, supra note 172, at 4-5; Election of Senators by the People, H.R. REP. No. 944, 53d Cong.,
2d Sess. 2 (1894).
287 26 CONG. REC. 7775 (1893).
288 28 CoNo. REC. 1519 (1896) (statement of Sen. Turpie); see id. at 6728 (statement of Sen.
Mitchell).
289 S. REP. No. 530, supra note 172 at 10.
290 H.R. REP. No. 368, 52d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1892); cf. S. REP. No. 530, supra note 172, at 7
("Senators do not owe their positions to the people, who are permanent, but the legislatures,
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The populist movement was hard to ignore. By 1910, some thirty-
one state legislatures had submitted requests that Congress convene a
constitutional convention pursuant to Article V for the purpose of
proposing an amendment on the direct election of senators.291 One
state legislature, California, had instructed its senators to vote for sub-
mission of such an amendment, and two other state legislatures had
formally urged Congress to adopt such an amendment. 292 Many
states, including states which had not called for a constitutional
amendment, had provided some means for the voters to instruct their
legislatures in the selection of senators. At the least, passage of the
amendment avoided Congress's duty to call a constitutional
convention.293
These arguments were difficult to counter. The record of dead-
locks and corruption made it difficult to claim that the people pos-
sessed less sense, were less qualified, than their representatives.
Venerable George Hoar of Massachusetts argued that direct election
took from "public officers to whom the great public duty of State leg-
islation is intrusted" and substituted "conventions composed of per-
sons without other responsibility. ' 294 Hoar contended that the people
were a far less permanent body than the legislature. "For a choice by
a permanent body, there must be a choice by a body lasting but a
day. '295 Some members argued that the great senators of history
could not have secured popular election,296 while others argued that
which are transient."). But see S. Do. No. 406, supra note 84, at 53 (statement of Sen. Hoar)
(Senate is the only "perpetual body" among the political branches).
291 Some seventy-five total applications were made. Three states, Montana, Nevada, and Or-
egon, applied six times each. CONSITTuTIONAL CONVENTON IMPLEMENTATION Acr Or 1984, S.
REP. No. 594, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 48-57 (Comm. Print 1984).
292 45 CONG. REC. 7113-20 (1910) (compiling resolutions). The various requests for a consti-
tutional convention are also compiled in Michael S. Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The
Constitutional Lessons of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 677, 765-89 (1993).
By 1909 more than half the states had a mechanism for a popular vote-only advisory-for
senators. MOWRY, supra note 258, at 81.
293 See 35 CONG. REe 2617 (1902) (statement of Sen. Dubois) ("[U]nless the Senate is al-
lowed to debate this question, enough States will act to take it out of our hands."); see also
ELEMCON OF U.S. SENATORS, H.R. REP. No. 125, 57th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-4 (1902); MEMORIAL
RELATIVE TO AMENDING TmE CONSTrrTUON OF THE UNITED STATES, S. Doc. No. 454, 60th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1908).
294 25 CONo. REC. 103-04 (1893).
295 Id.; see id. at 108 ("I think that it is best to commit this great function of choosing the
members of this body to the deliberate and careful judgment of men who are trusted with every
other legislative function of sovereignty, and not to adopt a method which in practice will com-
mit it to men whom the people trust with nothing else.").
296 23 CONo. REc. 106 (1893) (statement of Sen. Hoar) (suggesting that Daniel Webster,
Charles Sumner, and Salmon P. Chase would not have been elected); see also HOEBEKE, supra
note 34, at 175 (discussing circumstances under which Elihu Root was drafted for the Senate;
suggesting popular election has made it difficult to obtain election of such "elder statesmen").
91:500 (1997)
HeinOnline -- 91 Nw. U. L. Rev.  545 1996-1997
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
most of the senators had experience in the popularly-elected House
and thus the amendment would have little practical effect.29
Several members of Congress argued that direct election of sena-
tors threatened the equal suffrage of the states. "[I]t would be a fatal
movement to the equality of the States. When Senators are elected by
popular votes of States and not by the legislatures thereof it will be
forcibly argued that the constituents of Senators should be equal."298
The objection proved too much. No one had advocated that states be
deprived of their representation in the Senate; indeed, the Seven-
teenth Amendment had nothing to do with equal suffrage in the Sen-
ate. Whatever the merits of direct election of senators, the states bore
the benefits or burdens of reform equally. If this objection had merit,
we would expect that less populous states would have opposed the
Amendment, but no such pattern appeared.299
More persuasively, members argued that the Amendment took
from the states, not their equal representation, but their representa-
tion as states.300 The states were "sovereign, entitled ... to have a
separate branch of Congress to which they could.., send their ambas-
297 26 CONG. REc. 7765 (1893) (statement of Rep. Northway); see also AnRAMowrrz & SE-
GAL, supra note 228, at 15 ("Of the sixty-three Senates elected by state legislatures, fifty-one
matched the party chosen to run the House by the people.... [J]udging by party control, the
Senate was largely representing majoritarian concerns even prior to the passage of the Seven-
teenth Amendment.").
Furthermore, if populist sentiment demanded greater voter participation, there were other,
more familiar practices available. The first would have been instruction through legislation. A
second would have been popular instruction through referenda. See Easterling, supra note 245,
at 503 (Oregon's reforms convinced Senator Bristow of the need for initiatives and referenda).
298 35 CONG. REC. 2617 (1902) (statement of Sen. Stewart); see also 46 CONG. REc. 2244
(1911) (statement of Sen. Root); 35 CONG. REc. 2616 (1902) (statement of Sen. Hoar); id. at
6595 (statement of Sen. Vest).
299 In fact, the less populous Western states were among the most vocal advocates of direct
election. ABRAMOWITZ & SEGAL, supra note 228, at 19-20, 23-24. Of the 24 senators who voted
against the proposed amendment, three were Western Republicans, nine represented Southern
states (one Republican and eight Democrats), and twelve were from the East. GRIMES, supra
note 247, at 161. Zywicki suggests that Western states had long been more volatile in their
selection of their state legislatures and, consequently, their senators were envious of the seniority
of the Southern states. Direct election brought greater stability-and, therefore, greater senior-
ity-to Western states. Zywicki, supra note 34, at 1021, 1044; see also DANIEL J. ELAZAR,
AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEw FROM THM STATES 139-40 (2d ed. 1972) (Southern seniority
allowed those states more than their share of benefits); Kernell, supra note 229, at 676 (South
rotated state legislative seats, but not congressional seats).
300 H.R. REP. No. 1456, supra note 286, at 3 (views of the Minority); see Deborah J. Merritt,
Three Faces of Federalism: Finding a Formula for the Future, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1563, 1568
(1994) ("Today, individual senators may care about the autonomy of state government, but they
are just as likely to care about the environment, welfare reform, health care, mass transit, or
farm subsidies. Many senators have no experience in state government and their reliance on
state political machines for reelection is declining. Under these circumstances, there is no formal
or informal structural guarantee that senators (or anybody else) will represent the interests of
state governments in Washington." (footnote omitted)).
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sadors.' '301 In response, the amendment's supporters pointed out that
"a change in the mode or manner of selecting Senators would not in
the slightest manner interfere" with "whether the Senate should be
the representatives of the States rather [than] their people. '' 302 Rep-
resentation of states referred to "the fixed ratio of representation"
and "not... the mode or manner in which Senators should be cho-
sen."303 But here the Amendment's opponents had a point. It was
true enough that the Amendment did not trifle with the states as geo-
graphic districts; following passage of the Amendment, senators
would represent precisely the same territory as before. But the mode
or manner for choosing senators was hardly irrelevant to the question
of whom senators represented, and the states as political entities
(rather than mere territorial entities) would no longer be represented.
At some theoretical level senators had always represented the people,
so that the change to direct election was no change in constituency.
But at a more functional level, senators knew they represented state
legislatures and that they were immediately accountable to that body.
In this sense, the mode of election interfered directly with the manner
in which senators saw themselves as representatives of states.304
In the end the Senate went reluctantly, but surely. The states rat-
ified the Amendment in less than two years. Efforts to return to indi-
rect election met with no response.3 05
IV. "ULYSSES AT THE MAST": THE EFFECTS OF DIRECT
ELECTION OF SENATORS
The passage of the Seventeenth Amendment worked a structural
change in the composition of Congress. While I have discussed some
of the theory behind the Senate's original organization and subse-
quent reformation, in this Part, I consider the structural and practical
consequences of the Amendment, matters about which very little has
been written. If "[t]he failure of the Senate to represent state govern-
ments [was] a crucial constitutional development, '30 6 it is nevertheless
a maddeningly difficult proposition to prove. Prior efforts to measure
the effects of the Seventeenth Amendment have covered the popular
re-election of Senators previously chosen by their state legislatures, 30 7
301 H.R. REP. No. 1456, supra note 286, at 4 (views of the Minority).
302 S. REP. No. 794 (Part 2), supra note 270, at 4.
303 Id. at 4, 5; see also S. REP. No. 530, supra note 172, at 2-4.
304 Indeed, one of the arguments against instruction was that senators represented the people
at large, and no body capable of instructing the people could claim to be the people, only an-
other representative body. The Right of the Constituent to Instruct, supra note 99, at 156-60.
305 See 72 CONo. REc. 771 (1929) (Rep. Underhill, introducing JOINT RESOLUTION PROPOS-
IN) AN AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES PROVIDING FOR THE ELEC-
TION OF SENATORS, H.RJ. RES. 166, 71st Cong., 2d Sess.).
306 Riker, supra note 5, at 455.
307 ABRAmowTz & SEGAL, supra note 228, at 25.
547
91:500 (1997)
HeinOnline -- 91 Nw. U. L. Rev.  547 1996-1997
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
changes in the length of terms,308 voting patterns in pairs of senators
from the same state,309 and U.S. senators' experience in state legisla-
tures.310 Other studies rely on political theory.3 11 Curiously, no one
has asked, "What would the Senate look like if we did not have the
Seventeenth Amendment?" Sections A and B address that question
and the related question of how state legislatures might be different.
Section A begins with an analysis of the political congruence be-
tween state legislatures and their U.S. senators. Alexander Hamilton
anticipated that the states would send senators who were a "faithful
copy" of a majority of the legislature.31 2 Section A tests Hamilton's
hypothesis, comparing the political composition of state legislatures
against the senators selected from that state prior to 1913. This gives
some basis for comparing the choices the people have made since 1913
with the party affiliation of the candidate that likely would have been
chosen by the legislatures. In addition, this gives one immediate mea-
sure of the Amendment's effect-the congruence between the polit-
ical choices of the people and the political composition of their
legislatures.
Section B, building on the data in Section A, discusses the impact
of the Seventeenth Amendment on the political composition of state
legislatures. Section C lays out the Amendment's impact on instruc-
tion, recall, and tenure, and Section D concludes with a discussion of
how the Amendment has affected the Senate in its constitutionally-
assigned roles.
A. The Political Composition of the U.S. Senate
So far as I can determine, there has been no comprehensive study
of the effects of the Seventeenth Amendment on the political compo-
sition of the U.S. Senate, or its effects on state legislatures. According
to one recent article, "membership in the Senate did not change very
much after passage of the amendment. '313 Another pointed out that
in the election of 1914, apparently not one legislatively-chosen incum-
bent was defeated. 314 Other commentators have gone so far as to con-
clude that "direct election of senators has not brought about any
sweeping changes. ' 315 These observations are probably correct so far
as they describe that the privilege of incumbency held even after the
308 Zywicki, supra note 34, at 1047-54; Daynes, Direct Election, supra note 34, at 142-46.
309 Daynes, Direct Election, supra note 34, at 44-51.
310 Id. at 81-86, 98-101.
311 E.g., HOEBEKE, supra note 34; Riker, supra note 5; Brooks, supra note 34.
312 THE FEDERALIST No. 60, at 407 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
313 Amar, supra note 268, at 1129 & n.86.
314 ABRAMOWITZ & SEGAL, supra note 228, at 25.
315 BROADUS M. & LOUISE P. MITCHELL, A BIORAPHY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES: ITS Omoi, FORMATION, ADOPTION, INTERPRETATION 214 (1964).
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people acquired the right to elect their own senators and that few
election reforms have followed.3 16 But the Seventeenth Amendment,
in fact, had an immediate impact on the political composition of the
Senate.
I collected information on the political composition of state legis-
latures from 1865 to present 317 and compared the state legislative data
316 See, e.g., Carleton W. Sterling, Control of Campaign Spending: The Reformers' Paradox,
59 A.B.A. J. 1148, 1149 (1973) (stating that Seventeenth Amendment failed to stem campaign
spending and may have encouraged it).
317 Information from 1937 through 1993 was taken from the biennial BOOK OF THE STATES,
published by the Council of State Governments, and from a data base of James Garand of the
LSU Political Science Department. Information from 1994-95 was taken from "Preliminary Par-
tisan Composition of the State Legislatures-1994 Election," obtained from the National Con-
ference of State Legislatures.
Information prior to 1937 was collected from the following sources (listed alphabetically by
state): Arizona: "Legislature's Political Makeup Since Statehood," Amz. CAPITOL TIMES, June
10, 1987, at 2-3; California: JAMES D. DRISCOLL & DARRYL R. WHITE, LIrST OF CONSTITUTIONAL
OFFICERS, CONGRESSIONAL REPRESENTATIVES, MEMBERS OF THE CALIFORNIA STATE LEOIsLA-
TURE AND MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME COURT, 1849-1985, at 138-45 (1985); Colorado: Control
by TWo Major Political Parties of Governorship and General Assembly in Colorado from 1891 to
the Present (n.d.); Connecticut: CONNECTICUT STATE REGISTER AND MANUAL 184-87 (1995);
Delaware: Delaware General Assembly Majority Compositions (n.d.); Idaho: IDAHO BLUE
BOOK, 1993-1994, at 180-81 (1993); Illinois: SAMUEL K. GovE & RICHARD W. CARLSON, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE ILLINOIS GENERAL ASSEMBLY 181 (1972); SAMUEL K. GovE & GILBERT
Y. STEINER, THE ILLINOIS LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 40-41 (1954); BLUE BOOK OF THE STATE OF
ILLINOIS, 1931-1932 (1931); Letter from Dave Johnson, Office of the Illinois Secretary of State to
Jay Bybee, author (n.d.; copy on file with author); Indiana: A BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF
THE INDIANA GENERAL ASSEMBLY (2 vols.) (Rebecca A. Shepherd et al. eds., 1980); Iowa:
FRANK J. STORK & CYNTHIA A. CLNGAN, THE IOWA GENERAL ASSEMBLY: OUR LEGISLATIVE
HERITAGE, 1846-1980, at 5-8 (1980); Kansas: Membership in House of Representatives and Senate
(compiled by Legislative Reference Division of the Kansas State Library; n.d.); Kentucky: "Ken-
tucky General Assembly Party Affiliation" (n.d.); Maine: "Legislature of Maine: Political Com-
position" (n.d.); Massachusetts: CORNELrUS DALTON ET Al, LEADING THE WAY: A HISTORY OF
THE MASSACHUSETrs GENERAL COURT, 1629-1980, at 441-44 (1984); Michigan: MICHIGAN
MANUAL, 1993-1994, at 332-35 (1993); A SESQUICENTENNIAL LOOK AT THE MICHIGAN LEGISLA-
TURE 53-56 (1987); Minnesota: PoLrnIcs IN MINNESOTA: THE DIRECTORY (1995); see also MIN-
NESOTA CONGRESSMEN, LEGISLATORS, AND OTHER ELECTED STATE OFFICIALS: AN
ALPHABETICAL CHECK LIST, 1849-1971 (W.F. Toensing, comp. 1971); Missouri: "Missouri Legis-
lature, Party Representation, 1878-1937" (n.d.); Montana: ELLIS WALDRON & PAUL B. WILSON,
ATLAS OF MONTANA ELECTIONS, 1889-1976 (1978); Nevada: POLITICAL HISTORY OF NEVADA
193-222 (9th ed. 1990); New Jersey: JOSEPHINE A. FITZGERALD, MANUAL OF THE LEGISLATURE
OF NEW JERSEY 192-94 (1940); New Mexico: JACK E. HOLMES, POLITICS IN NEW MEXICO 316-19
(1967); NEW MEXICO BLUE BOOK, 1935-1936, at 13-14; THE NEW MExIco BLUE BOOK, 1929-30,
at 43-44; THE NEW MEXIco BLUE BOOK, 1926-27, at 41-51; LAws OF NEW MEXICO, 1931, at v;
LAWS OF NEw MEXIco, 1933 (n.p.); New York: "Number of Democrats and Republicans in the
Senate and Assembly, 1900-1953" (n.d.); hand-compiled statistics for 1893-1906 from The New
York State Library (copy on file with author); North Dakota: NORTH DAKOTA CENTENNIAL
BLUE BOOK, 1889-1989, at 229-376 (1989); Ohio: "Ohio General Assembly, Historical Political
Party Affiliations" (n.d.), compiled from ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE, OHIO
STATISTICS, AND ROSTERS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY; Oklahoma: DIRECTORY OF
OKLAHOMA, 1983; Oregon: "Party Composition of the Oregon Legislature, 1859-" (n.d.), com-
piled from CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF OREGON'S LEGISLATURES (Cecil L. Edwards, comp. 1993);
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with data on the actual election of senators. I then simulated the func-
tioning of the Act of 1866. Prior to 1866, state legislatures elected
senators in one of the two following ways: (1) they elected senators in
the same way they passed laws, by a vote of each house separately; or
(2) they elected senators in a convention format, by vote of the legisla-
tors of both houses.3 18 The Act of 1866 employed both methods. It
required that state legislatures first vote as separate houses. If no can-
didate received a majority in both houses, then the legislature voted in
joint assembly.3 19
For each class of senators, 320 I compared the party affiliations of
the members of each state's upper house with that of its lower house;
if the majority party in each house was the same, I then compared the
majority's party affiliation with that of the state's U.S. senator elected
in that year. Any state which showed perfect political congruence be-
tween the two houses and the state's U.S. senators (or any state for
which we did not have complete statistics),321 was reported as consis-
tent. For those states in which there was a split in the political control
of the two houses, I combined state senates and assemblies into a sin-
gle body and then compared the political composition of the body as a
Pennsylvania: 88 TBm PENNSYLVANIA MANUAL 495 (1947); South Dakota: 2 BIOGRAPHICAL DI-
RECTORY OF THE SOUTH DAKOTA LEGISLATURE, 1889-1989, at 1235 (1989); handwritten notes
from the Government Documents Department, South Dakota State Library (copy on file with
author); Tennessee: "Tennessee General Assembly Political Party Designations" (compiled by
Tennessee State Library & Archives, n.d.); Texas: Political Composition of the Legislature for
Selected Years Other Than Democrat (n.d.); Utah: RICHARD D. POLL ET AL, UTAH'S HISTORY
711 (1978); Vermont: VERMONT LEGISLATIVE DIRECTORY (published biennially) (1876-1939);
Washington: STATE OF WASHINGTON: MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATURE, 1889-1991, at 1-4 (1991);
West Virginia: WEST VIRGINIA BLUE BOOK 429-30 (Darrell E. Holmes ed., 1993); Wisconsin:
WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, 1995-1996, at 276 (1995); Wyoming: 1973 WYOMING OFFICIAL DIREC-
TORY 161 (1973).
Nebraska's legislature is non-partisan. Minnesota's was non-partisan until 1986.
318 G. HAYNES, ELECTION OF SENATORS, supra note 33, at 19-35.
319 See supra note 238.
320 The Constitution divides senators into three classes, so that in any two year period approx-
imately one-third of Senate seats are up for election. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 2.
321 Although there are some gaps in the historical data, I had sufficient data for 1865-1913 to
test the hypothesis that state legislatures selected U.S. senators along partisan lines. Data was
complete for 1937 to present and nearly complete for 1913-1937. As explained in note 317,
supra, information for 1937 to the present had been previously compiled. Information for 1865-
1937, however, had to be collected state by state. In many cases, state archivists advised that the
information simply did not exist, or that, if it existed, it was in a form that could not be readily
compiled. Among the states for which I did not have complete data are the eleven states of the
Confederacy which, after Reconstruction, voted heavily Democratic. By oral tradition, Southern
Democratic senators are an accurate reflection of the political composition of their state
legislatures.
For 1869, 1 had information on 24 percent of the states. By including the Southern states, I
had 54 percent. For 1889, 1 had data for one half of the states; including the Southern states, I
had data for 79 percent of the states. For 1913, 1 had data for 71 percent of the states; 87 percent,
by including the Southern states.
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whole with the political affiliation of the U.S. senator elected by the
legislature (1865-1913) or the people (1914-present). In sum, the
study first predicted party affiliation of senators on the basis of sepa-
rate votes in each house. If that method failed to produce a single
candidate (identified by party), the study looked at the combined leg-
islature to predict a candidate. I only marked as inconsistent those
cases in which the state legislature was controlled by one party in a
given year and either the legislature (prior to 1913) or the people
(post-1913) sent a U.S. senator from a different political party.
Figure 1 is a summary of the data.322 In Figure 1, the solid lines
show the actual composition of the U.S. Senate, by party affiliation.
The dotted lines show the composition of the U.S. Senate (again by
party affiliation),323 assuming that state legislatures voted along party
lines. The difference between the solid and dotted lines represents
changes in party affiliation of the total number of Democrats and
Republicans in the U.S. Senate. For example, prior to 1893, there is
no difference between the solid and dotted lines; I had no evidence
that state legislatures selected a senator that represented a party other
than the party controlling the legislature. Hamilton was, as we had
expected, correct. In 1893, however, the North Dakota legislature
sent William Roach, a Democrat, to the U.S. Senate. Both houses of
the North Dakota legislature had a Republican majority.324 This is
shown in Figure 1 as a net change in the composition of the Senate for
the six years that Senator Roach served (he was not re-elected). If,
during that same term, another state, having a Democratic legislature,
had sent a Republican senator, Figure 1 would have shown no net
change in the political composition of the Senate.
Figure 1 demonstrates that the Seventeenth Amendment, in fact,
had an immediate and dramatic impact on the political composition of
the U.S. Senate. Between 1865 and the 1914 election (the first elec-
tion under the newly-ratified Amendment), there was near-perfect
identity between the political affiliations of state legislatures and the
senators they elected. The first clear aberration was not until 1893,
and there are only scattered changes between 1893 and 1915.325 Even
if no incumbent was defeated in the election of 1914, popular election
shifted the balance in the Senate. Between January 1913 and January
322 Summary.data on which Figure 1 is based are attached as an Appendix.
323 For simplicity, I have only charted Democrats and Republicans. Although other parties,
Free Silver, Labor, Socialist, and others are accounted for, they are less significant, especially
post-1913.
324 G. HAYNES, ELECTION OF SENATORS, supra note 33, at 64-65. Apparently, there was also
cross-party voting in the first elections. KERR, supra note 38, at 19.
325 E.g., Kansas (1897), Kentucky (1909), Nevada (1911), and Oregon (1909, 1913). Oregon
does not represent a true aberration, because it had adopted a ballot requiring candidates to the
state legislature to pledge to support the U.S. Senate candidate who won the straw popular vote.
See G. HAYNES, ELECTION OF SENATORS, supra note 33, at 14547.
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1915, control of the Senate had changed from Republican to Demo-
crat. The data suggest that the election of 1914 saw seven senate seats
go to candidates representing the opposite party than controlled their
respective state legislatures; six of the seven seats went to Democrats
in states with Republican-dominated legislatures.3 26 The election of
1914 thus gave the Democrats a majority in the Senate (54-42);
whereas, the Senate, in the absence of the Seventeenth Amendment,
probably would have been deadlocked (48-48). The results for the
succeeding elections are even more dramatic. In 1917, the Democrats
retained control of the Senate (54-42). Had senators been elected by
state legislatures, the data suggest that the political control of the Sen-
ate would have returned to the Republicans (43-53).
Although it is beyond my present purposes to detail all of the
changes the Seventeenth Amendment might have wrought in the
political composition of the U.S. Senate, I have several observations.
First, under the assumptions made in Figure 1, control of the Senate
326 The states were California, Colorado, Nevada, Oregon, South Dakota, and Wisconsin.
Indiana, with a heavily Democratic legislature, sent a Republican. GUIDE TO U.S. ELECTIONS,
supra note 273.
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would have shifted from Democrat to Republican in 1917-20, 1933-
34,327 1945-46, and 1949-58. Significantly, the data also suggest that
for the 1994 elections in which the Republicans regained control of
the Senate, Democrats would have retained the Senate by a substan-
tial margin (70-30).328 Senate control would likewise have shifted
from Republicans to Democrats in 1981-86.
Second, the political composition of state legislatures and the
political composition of the Senate are nearly identical prior to 1913.
In the period just following ratification of the Seventeenth Amend-
ment, they are not identical, although generally congruent. Between
1921 and 1932, for example, the Republicans controlled the Senate,
although they did not enjoy the majority they might have had if state
legislatures were electing senators. The explanations for this are un-
doubtedly complex. One obvious explanation is the malapportion-
ment of state legislatures. Malapportionment generally favored rural
interests, which in the modem era were largely Republican. 29 In
part, the Seventeenth Amendment was a land-grab by urban interests
in industrial states who saw a chance to eliminate rural domination of
state legislatures. 330
The debates over the Seventeenth Amendment had recognized
the malapportionment problem. One House report noted that malap-
portionment of state legislatures distorted popular choices that a
properly apportioned legislature might otherwise make.3 31 Senator
327 This is perhaps the most dramatic change because it is the first two years of the New Deal.
Had the Republicans held control of the Senate, it surely would have affected Roosevelt's "Hun-
dred Days."
328 I have made no attempt to account for death or resignation in my data. I focused exclu-
sively on party identification. According to my data, the Senate in the 104th Congress would,
absent death or resignation, have been evenly divided between Democrats and Republicans.
Republican control of the Senate resulted from the resignations of David Boren (D-Okla.) and
Albert Gore (D-Tenn.), who were replaced in special elections by James Inhofe (R-Okla.) and
Fred Thompson (R-Tenn.). Following the 1994 elections, Senators Ben Nighthorse Campbell
(Colo.) and Richard Shelby (Ala.) switched from the Democratic to the Republican party. In a
special election in January 1996, Ron Wyden, an Oregon Democrat, assumed the seat of Bob
Packwood, who had resigned. Prior to the November 1996 election, Republicans claimed a 53-
47 advantage in the Senate.
329 ABRAMowrrz & SEGAL, supra note 228, at 15, 23. The predominance of rural interests in
state senates is a more recent phenomena. See MAiN, supra note 36, at 95 ("Despite the majority
of farmers in the [colonial] population, there were relatively few farmers in the upper houses.").
330 Zywicki, supra note 34, at 1020. See HOEBEKE, supra note 34, at 4-5 (stating that popular
election encouraged political machines); John D. Buenker, The Urban Political Machine and the
Seventeenth Amendment, 56 J. AM. HisT. 305, 320 (1969) ("The fate of the Seventeenth Amend-
ment in the major industrial states amply demonstrates that the urban political machine was one
of the most consistent and influential supporters of this reform."). As Professor Zywicki has
shown, the urban-rural split is an incomplete explanation, because much of the Amendment's
support came from western and other rural-dominated states. Zywicki, supra note 34, at 1021.
331 H.R. REP. No. 368, 52d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1892); see also H.R. REP. No. 368 (Part 2), 52d
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1892) (views of the Minority).
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Edmunds of Vermont argued that people of various areas should have
a right of representation and not be overwhelmed by "mere weight of
numbers that might occupy only a corner of the State and possess in-
terests and cherish ambitions quite unlike those of all the other sec-
tions of the commonwealth. ' 332 Members of Congress noted that
malapportionment favored Republicans, and that direct election of
senators favored urban wealthy and poor, while it worked against
middle class farmers. 333 On the other hand, the House had great in-
centive to see the Seventeenth Amendment adopted. Once senators
represented the people-a body already represented in the House of
Representatives-there was greater congruence between the electors
and their representatives in Congress, and less opportunity for inter-
ference from the states. For Representatives in the House, the Seven-
teenth Amendment reduced the opposition to their constituencies,
thereby increasing their power and making their votes more important
to special interests. 334
In theory, the reapportionment of state legislatures in the 1960s
following the one person, one vote decisions 335 should have suggested
greater congruence between the political composition of state legisla-
tures and that of the Senate. In fact, there is greater congruence be-
ginning about 1959 (prior to the reapportionment decisions) and
continuing until 1973. Reapportionment may be a satisfactory expla-
nation for the consistency in the 1960s, but it cannot explain large var-
iations beginning in the 1970s. This post-Watergate era shows heavy
domination by Democrats in state legislatures, but far more modest
Democratic Senate majorities in 1973-80 and 1987-94, and Republican
Senates in 1981-86 and 1995-96.336
B. The Political Composition of State Legislatures
In the preceding section, I noted the changes that might have oc-
curred in the political composition of the Senate-some quite dra-
332 S. Doc. No. 406, supra note 84, at 62-63. Senator Edmunds also observed that "an elec-
tion by a majority of all the people of a State is radically a different thing from the choice of the
same officers by the people (through their representatives) of the separate political divisions of
it." Id. at 60.
333 See 31 CONG. REc. 4815 (1898) (statement of Rep. Cummings) (examples of Connecticut
and New York); 25 CONG. REc. 104 (1893) (statement of Sen. Hoar).
334 Zywicki, supra note 34, at 1040-41. Zywicki also points out that the great congruence
between election of senators and representatives would reduce the lobbyists' costs in the Senate.
335 E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
336 One explanation for the domination of the Democrats in state legislatures at a time when
their numbers in the Senate and their control of the White House was far more modest is a trend
in the states toward professional legislatures, which may favor Democrats. Morris P. Fiorina,
Divided Government in the American States: A Byproduct of Legislative Professionalism?, 88
AM. PoL Sci. REv. 304, 306-08 (1994); see also Corwin, supra note 208, at 575 (showing that in
states with professional legislatures, incumbency rates are about the same as for members of
Congress).
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matic-assuming that state legislatures voted along political lines.
That assumption has a solid historical foundation. For the post-1913
elections, I discussed possible changes in the Senate, holding the polit-
ical composition of state legislatures constant. But there was nothing
constant about the political composition of state legislatures so long as
they held the power to elect U.S. senators. The political composition
of state legislatures was not independent of their duty to elect
senators.
If Hamilton was correct that senates would be a "faithful copy" of
legislatures, 337 he might have also anticipated the influence that senate
elections would have on state legislatures. Indeed, the converse of
Hamilton's statement was also often true: legislatures were faithful
copies of their senators. The real questions are which is the copy,
which is the original, and does it even matter? The election reform
movement of the 1890s made apparent to all, if it was not clear before,
the connection between state legislative elections and U.S. Senate
elections. But the reforms-requiring candidates for state office (irre-
spective of their party affiliation) to pledge support for the senatorial
candidate who won the straw po11338 -had the effect of divorcing state
legislative elections from Senate elections. The Seventeenth Amend-
ment made this divorce lawful and final.
Direct election of senators had a leveling influence on the polit-
ical composition of state legislatures. Until the 1830s, candidates for
the Senate did not come forward until after the state legislative elec-
tions. This limited the candidate's campaigning to the legislators and
encouraged fidelity to them.339 Beginning in the 1830s, candidates be-
gan campaigning to the people ("canvassing the public"), who re-
sponded by electing a slate of legislators pledged to elect a particular
candidate. 340 The question of whom state legislators would support
for senator became an important campaign issue. As President, An-
drew Jackson recognized the potential and maneuvered to get the
right people in place in state legislatures in order to secure his support
in the Senate.34 1 The most famous example of the influence of Senate
elections on local elections was the legendary Lincoln-Douglas de-
bates, which were not a plea for popular vote, but for a slate of state
legislative candidates pledged to support either Lincoln or Douglas.34 2
337 THE FEDERALIST No. 60, at 406-07 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
338 See supra text accompanying notes 240-42.
339 Riker, supra note 5, at 463.
340 HOEBEKE, supra note 34, at 87; Riker, supra note 5, at 463.
341 Eaton, supra note 108, at 313, 316-17.
342 TmE Lmrco.N-DouoLAs DEBATEs 371-73 (Harold Holzer ed., 1993). Douglas got the
seat, although Lincoln got the popular vote. Haynes, Popular Election, supra note 280, at 102;
see also Eaton, supra note 108, at 311, 315.
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The U.S. Senate race was the issue in the 1858 campaign for the Illi-
nois legislature.
Figure 1 is also a measure of the gap between state legislatures
and their senators. The data suggests that in the 1970s and 1980s, the
political composition of state legislatures was nearly independent of
the composition of the Senate. It is evidence of the completeness of
the divorce. For example, if it is hard to think of the Democratic party
during the Carter Administration controlling 81 seats in the Senate,
the data may suggest that re-linking senators and legislatures would
have tempered the political composition of state legislatures in the
late 1970s. If the country did not want a Senate so tilted toward the
Democrats, perhaps it would have altered the political composition of
its state legislatures.
The Seventeenth Amendment contributed to, but of course did
not cause, the gap between legislatures and the Senate. That process
had already begun, and reform efforts culminating in the Seventeenth
Amendment demonstrated the growing mistrust of state legislatures.
The Seventeenth Amendment, however, hastened that process. As
Elihu Root argued, robbing legislatures "of power, of dignity, of con-
sequence" would lead to "state legislatures growing less and less com-
petent, less and less worthy of trust, and less and less efficient in the
performance of their duties. You can never develop competent and
trusted bodies of public servants by expressing distrust of them, by
taking power away from them. '343
Direct election may also have given the people less representa-
tion in Washington. If the Amendment diminished the stature of state
legislatures, it has failed to spur American voters to the polls to secure
their representation in senatorial elections. Voter participation has re-
mained low.344 This non-voting segment of the population is unrepre-
sented in the choice of senators. To put it another way, senators may
not accurately reflect their constituents because their constituents do
not vote. The same could be said, of course, for state legislators, who
are also elected by a relatively small proportion of the electorate.
However, even if state legislators do not fully reflect their constituents
either, they are at least physically and metaphorically closer to their
constituents; the smaller the group represented the more likely repre-
sentatives will reflect-or at least understand-the interests of their
343 46 CONG. REC. 2243 (1911); see also HOEBEKE, supra note 34, at 24 ("[D]emocratic re-
formers ... never managed to improve the popularity of representative bodies by diminishing
their authority.... [The respect accorded state legislatures and the quality of such bodies] sub-
sided proportionately with the amount of control that was taken from them.").
344 E.g., Ruy A. TEIXEIRA, THE DISAPPEARING AMERICAN VOTER 9 (1992) (showing decline
in turnout in Presidential elections since 1820s); Norman Luttberg, Comparative Insights Into
Voter Participation: Are There Barriers That We Can Remove, in AMERICAN BAR AssocIAION,
THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE AMERICAN VOTER RE-VISITED, app. A, fig. 3 (1990) (comparing
decline in voting in presidential, gubernatorial, and congressional elections).
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constituents. Prior to the Seventeenth Amendment, senatorial elec-
tions were extremely important occasions in which all legislators were
likely to participate. Thus, in pre-Seventeenth Amendment elections,
all persons were likely to have been (at least nominally) represented
in the voting for U.S. senators. Given the level of participation in
modern elections, we cannot say the same today. As John Jay under-
stood, election of senators by state legislators had "vastly the advan-
tage of elections by the people in their collective capacity, where the
activity of party zeal taking advantage of the supineness, the igno-
rance, and the hopes and fears of the unwary and interested, often
places men in office by the votes of a small proportion of the
electors." 34 5
C. Instruction, Recall, and Rotation
The Seventeenth Amendment brought a formal end to instruc-
tion.34 6 It could not end the practice of advising senators, but it took
from the legislatures any remaining mechanism for enforcing their
views.34 7 In the post-Seventeenth Amendment era, state legislatures
continued to issue requests, but it was understood that the senators
would suffer any political consequences on the merits of their votes,
rather than for having disobeyed an order from the legislature. Thus,
an important consequence of the Seventeenth Amendment has been
that senators from any given state have been less inclined to vote to-
gether; senators have become more independent since 1913.348 The
Seventeenth Amendment has exacerbated the effects of per capita
voting.
No modern analogue to instruction has replaced it. The closest
mechanism is probably the public opinion poll. The public's lack of
familiarity with specific issues, and the way in which the polls are con-
ducted limits the usefulness of the poll. At least, polls convey general
impressions or moods on very broad issues. They are, however, inade-
quate substitutes for legislative directives, which were issued in writ-
ten form and on the record. One other substitute for instruction is the
public initiative or referendum. The referendum has found some suc-
cess at the state and local level, but has not yet shown its usefulness at
345 Tim FEDERALIST No. 64, at 432-33 (John Jay) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
346 2 G. HAYNES, SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 169, at 1027; Bresler, supra
note 100, at 365; Eaton, supra note 108, at 319; Colgrove, supra note 98, at 1-21.
347 I have previously discussed the circumstances under which Congress may advise, but not
instruct, the President. Jay S. Bybee, Advising the PresidenL Separation of Powers and the Fed-
eral Advisory Committee Act, 104 YALE L.J. 51 (1994).
348 Daynes, Direct Election, supra note 34, at 44. Daniel Elazar has discussed intrastate polit-
ical unity and a state's ability to translate that into power in the Senate, as shown by voting
agreement between a state's senators. ELAZAR, supra note 299, at 21-23 & tbl. 4.
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a national level.3 49 Indeed, short of Article V, there is presently no
means of calling for a national referendum.350
Recall, as a mechanism of control over senators, has fared no bet-
ter. During the debates over the Seventeenth Amendment, Senator
Owen proposed that the people should possess both the power to
elect senators and the right to recall them.351 Just as the referendum is
a cumbersome device for instructing senators, popular recall is expen-
sive and difficult.352 Although state legislatures never enjoyed the
right of recall of U.S. senators, they were far better positioned to ob-
tain it and exercise it than the populace.
Rotation has followed a more convoluted path. During the ratifi-
cation debates, Senator DePew warned that senators popularly
elected would have the "tenure of their place here" questioned by the
people in each election.3 53 And Senate historian George Haynes pre-
dicted in 1906 that popular election would tend to shorten terms in the
Senate:
[T]he choice of senators by state legislatures has tended to produce a
continuity of service, and hence an efficiency based upon long experi-
ence in legislature work, highly exceptional in popular governments....
[I]f the effects of popular elections be judged by results produced in the
election of governors and representatives in Congress, it is clear that the
trading of localities, the restless craving for rotation in office, the insis-
tence that the prizes be widely distributed, would make it highly improb-
able that a senator would be given more than one or, at most, two terms.
When the loss to the country is estimated if the service of a Webster or a
Clay, a Sherman or a Hoar, were limited to six even to twelve years, the
innovator may well hesitate to urge popular election; for the evidence is
incontrovertible that the American people still cherish the notion of ro-
tation of office, and that they are particularly loath to reelect men for
long terms of legislative service.3 54
349 CRONIN, supra note 99, at ch. 7.
350 See Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920); see also Jonathan L. Walcoff, Note, The Uncon-
stitutionality of Voter Initiative Applications for Federal Constitutional Conventions, 85 CoLuM.
L. REv. 1525 (1985). But see Akhil R. Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional
Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1994) (asserting that popular referen-
dum may be constitutional); Kobach, supra note 34 (suggesting that the means by which the
Seventeenth and Nineteenth Amendments came about justifies an alternative amending
process).
351 45 CoNG. REC. 7125 (1910). In that era, one state, Arizona, provided for the recall of its
U.S. senators. 2 G. HAYNES, SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 169, at 1025; see
CRONIN, supra note 99, at 125-27.
352 CRONIN, supra note 99, at 125-56.
353 35 CONG. REC. 3980 (1902).
354 G. HAYNES, ELECTlON OF SENATORS, supra note 33, at 226. According to Haynes, the
Seventeenth Amendment "was a later phase of the movement to democratize American govern-
ment, a movement which had begun to manifest itself many years earlier in the broadening of
the suffrage, the multiplication of elective offices and the shortening of their terms." 2 G.
HAYNES, SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 169, at 1041.
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History has shown these predictions incorrect. Senators had al-
ready begun to regard their positions as careers in the 1890s, and the
number of senators serving consecutive terms remained about the
same from the 1890s to the 1950s, but has increased since then.3 55
Rather than serving to limit senators' terms, the Seventeenth Amend-
ment has contributed to longer terms.35 6 There are at least two rea-
sons for this phenomenon. First, once the election of senators was
taken from the legislatures, the election was abandoned to party ma-
chines. Party bosses, not legislative compromise, determined who
would be elected.357 Machines could more easily manipulate candi-
dates and the populace than they could the egos of legislators.
Second, the ambitions of the legislators themselves had helped to
curb the terms served in the Senate. The Seventeenth Amendment
worked against rotation or tenure limits because the elective body
(the people) had less ambition to the office it controlled. Legislators
had more natural ambition to the office and thus more incentive to
watch senators.358 As a result senators had to be responsive to legisla-
tors' concerns. The ambitions of state legislators helped curb lengthy
stays in the Senate.359
Whatever natural rotation we assumed the people would impose
on their senators has not materialized. The alternative-rotation im-
posed by state law-was struck down by the Supreme Court in U.S.
355 GEORGE F. WILL, RESTORATION 80-83 & tbl. 4 (1992); Kernell, supra note 229, at 677.
356 Daynes, Direct Election, supra note 34, at 142-45, 152.
357 HOEBEKE, supra note 34, at 190.
358 Colgrove, supra note 98, at IX-21; see also DAVID J. ROTHMAN, POLIICS AND POWER:
THE UNITED STATES SENATE, 1869-1901, at 124-31 (1966) (showing that senators had substantial
experience in local government); Heinz Eulaw, Expectations, in THE LEGISLATIVE SYSTEM 129-
30 (John C. Wahlke et al., eds., 1962) (surveying state legislators' ambitions to other offices);
Deborah J. Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century,
88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 16 (1988) (senators increasingly lack experience in local politics); Daynes,
Direct Election, supra note 34, at 124-29 (demonstrating that senators with local or state political
experience decreased dramatically after 1913). State legislators have shown greater stability of
membership. Richard G. Niemi & Laura R. Winsky, Membership Turnover in U.S. State Legisla-
tures: Trends and Effects of Districting, 12 LEGIs. STUD. Q. 115 (1987); Kwang S. Shin & John S.
Jackson III, Membership Turnover in U.S. State Legislatures: 1931-1976, 4 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 95
(1979). State legislatures enjoy substantial benefits of incumbency, even though their elections
are frequently less visible and not as well financed as their congressional counterparts. Malcolm
E. Jewell & David Breaux, The Effect of Incumbency on State Legislative Elections, 13 LEGIS.
STUD. Q. 495, 496, 511-12 (1988).
359 WILL, supra note 355, at 84. While incumbency remains a substantial factor in re-election,
after 1960, "the electoral position of senators becomes more tenuous as the number of terms
served increases." Peter Tuekel, Length of Incumbency and the Re-election Chances of U.S. Sen-
ators, 8 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 283, 285 (1983). Re-election rates increase between first and second
terms, but fall off after the second and third senate terms. Professor Tuckel attributes this to
redistribution of power in the Senate in the 1950s (which enhanced the visibility of junior sena-
tors) and television (which "may decrease the reelection changes of veteran senators"). Id. at
286-87.
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Term Limits v. Thornton,360 which means that the only methods re-
maining are self-imposed rotation and constitutional amendment.
D. The Senate's Constitutional Functions
As I discussed in Section B, as state legislatures involved them-
selves in the election of senators and concerned themselves with na-
tional affairs, there was a reciprocal effect: the importance of national
affairs affected state elections. There was a leveling or harmonizing
effect in political affiliation when the elections of U.S. senators and
members of state assemblies were linked. We would anticipate that
there was a harmonizing as well between state interests in national
issues and congressional handling of such issues.
After the Seventeenth Amendment, state legislatures no longer
held a leveling influence, and the Senate was freed from the discipline
of the body best situated to recognize the impact of federal legislation
on state laws. 361 The Senate continued to represent people within
state geographical boundaries, but it no longer represented the people
within the states as a political unit. The Senate had become a smaller,
more detached version of the House of Representatives. As the Sen-
ate lost any incentive to police itself for the states' account, the task
fell instead to the Supreme Court, which shortly found the Tenth
Amendment tautologous 362 and left the questions of state-federal re-
lations to a political process 363 that no longer represented the states'
political interests.364 In contest after contest between Congress and
the states, the states lost control over commerce,365 succumbed to the
allure of conditional federal spending,366 and, through the Court's in-
tervention, barely avoided direct control by Congress. 367 Congress
has since discovered that it may employ the states to its own ends,
360 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995).
361 See 46 CONG. REC. 2244 (1911) (statement of Sen. Root) ("[W]hen members of this body
have to explain to the State legislature the reasons for their action, they meet minds that are
competent and trained for the appreciation of their explanation. The people at large have far
less understanding upon the subject.").
362 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
363 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 554 (1985); see also Brooks,
supra note 34.
364 See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 645 n.3 (1966) (New York's senators spon-
sored legislation with the "explicit purpose" of preempting New York's voting requirements.).
365 E.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1 (1937). But see Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996); United States
v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
366 E.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548
(1937); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); see Thomas R. McCoy & Barry Friedman,
Conditional Spending: Federalism's Trojan Horse, 1988 Sup. CT. REv. 85.
367 See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992); see also Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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without being politically accountable for the cost of the programs.3 68
The Court is simply not an adequate braking mechanism for Con-
gress's own ambitions. 369 Congress, determined to lead, has wrested
the whip handle from the states and found itself unrestrained.
So far I have discussed the role the states were intended to play in
restraining Congress and the changes the Seventeenth Amendment
facilitated, changes the Court itself has acknowledged. In Garcia, the
Court observed that "changes in the structure of the Federal Govern-
ment... not the least of which has been the substitution of popular
election of Senators by the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment
in 1913 may work to alter the influence of the States in the federal
political process. ' 370 The Seventeenth Amendment, however, did not
affect matters of federalism alone. In this final Section, I review the
impact of the Seventeenth Amendment on other constitutional func-
tions of the Senate.
1. The Advice and Consent Power.-As I have previously
noted,371 there was no formal connection between the states and the
Senate's advice and consent power outside of the relationship be-
tween state legislatures and their senators. The informal link was, of
course, instruction.
States apparently did not instruct frequently on appointments,
but there are several significant instances. In 1834, for example, Presi-
dent Jackson nominated Roger Taney as Secretary of the Treasury.
The Senate rejected him the following day-the Senate's first rejec-
tion of a cabinet nominee. At least four senators opposed to Taney
voted against instructions from their legislatures.372 In a celebrated
case, New York Senators Roscoe Conkling and Thomas Platt so ob-
jected to President Garfield's nomination of a fellow New York Re-
publican that they resigned, assuming that the New York Legislature
would reaffirm its support and immediately return them to the U.S.
Senate. The New York Legislature refused.373
Even if the states were not routinely involved in the appoint-
ments process, the impact of direct election of the political composi-
tion of the senate and its concomitant effect on the Senate's advice
368 Merritt, supra note 300, at 17.
369 See Tler Pipe Indus. v. Washington State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 259-65 (1987)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
370 Garcia, 469 U.S. at 554; see United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1639 (1995) (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (noting the "absence of structural mechanisms" to force the political branches to
preserve "the federal balance").
371 See supra text accompanying notes 87-88.
372 CARL B. Swis-mR, ROGER B. TANEY 287-88 (1936); see also id. at 312-13 (noting that
Maryland House refused to issue resolution or instructions in favor of Taney's nomination to the
Supreme Court).
373 2 G. HAYNES, SENATE OF TmE UNrrnD STATES, supra note 169, at 745-47.
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and consent power cannot be overlooked. States certainly would have
had a particular interest in federal district and court of appeals judges
with jurisdiction over the state's geographical area and other political
appointments, and these have been affected. Even the appointment
of Justices to the Supreme Court was not a matter in which the states
were disinterested.374 Under the assumptions explained in Part IV.A,
the Seventeenth Amendment affected the composition of the Senate
and would have resulted in a change in political control of the Senate
during the administrations of Presidents Wilson (1917-22), Franklin
Roosevelt (1933-34), Truman (1945-46, 1949-52), Eisenhower (1953-
58), Reagan (1981-86), and Clinton (1995-). These periods cover, for
example, the appointments of Sherman Minton, Tom Clark, Earl War-
ren, John Harlan, William Brennan, Charles Whittaker, Potter Stew-
art, Sandra Day O'Connor, William Rehnquist (as Chief Justice), and
Antonin Scalia. In the cases of Presidents Wilson, Roosevelt, Truman,
and Reagan, each found support in a sympathetic Senate and might
have faced a hostile one. Only Eisenhower had a hostile Senate and
might have faced a sympathetic one. Of the nominees during these
periods, only Sherman Minton and William Rehnquist faced serious
opposition, and we can only speculate as to whether they would have
been confirmed by a Senate controlled by the other party. On the
other hand, President Eisenhower's appointment of Democrat Wil-
liam Brennan was a recess appointment and was to show his biparti-
san spirit just before the election.3 75 Had Eisenhower faced a
Republican Senate, he might not have been as conciliatory in his
choice.
2. The Treaty Power.-The states' power to speak in foreign af-
fairs found its voice in the states' senators. Prior to the Seventeenth
Amendment, the states instructed on treaties376 and on related mat-
ters such as embargoes. 377 The state-led movement to open the Sen-
ate's proceedings resulted in part from closed deliberations over the
Jay Treaty. So long as the Senate was cloaked in secrecy, no one, in-
374 In 1893, New York senators successfully opposed two U.S. Supreme Court nominees from
New York. President Grover Cleveland ultimately nominated Edward Douglass White of Loui-
siana. THE SUPREME COURT Juslca.s, supra note 167, at 273; HOEBEKE, supra note 34, at 111.
375 THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note 167, at 448; Stephen J. Wermiel, The Nomina-
tion of Justice Brennan: Eisenhower's Mistake? A Look at the Historical Record, 11 CONST.
COMM. 515, 521-24, 533 (1994-95).
376 32 CONo. REc. 838 (1899) (instructions of California to support treaty with Spain); id. at
2125 (same; instructions of South Dakota); Katherine F. Nelson, Resolving Native American
Land Claims and the Eleventh Amendment" Changing the Balance of Power, 39 ViLL. L. REv.
525, 580 & n.339 (1994) (instructions of New York to secure treaty with Seneca nation; citations
omitted); see also 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 72, at 346 (statement of James Madison)
(noting instructions of New Jersey on treaty with. Great Britain and Spain).
377 John Quincy Adams' refusal to abide his instructions on an embargo bill lead to an early
vote on his replacement and to his own resignation. Colgrove, supra note 98, X-59-64.
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cluding state legislatures, had an opportunity to weigh in on the Sen-
ate's deliberations.378
More recent experience with the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GAIT) and the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) confirms that, post-Seventeenth Amendment, the states re-
tain a strong interest in treaties, and it reminds us of the states' lack of
official representation in Washington. For example, the National
Conference of State Legislatures supported ratification of GATT "as
long as the pact includes guarantees for state legislative authority and
principles of federalism. '379 Ironically, one proposal suggested a
point-of-contact person between states and the U.S. Trade Represen-
tative on NAFrA and GATE: "To best protect states measures, state
legislatures should be part of the state-federal communications
loop."380
3. The Impeachment Power. -The Senate's role in impeach-
ments38' is unique among its powers (because it is more a judicial than
a legislative function) and seems ill-suited to interference by the
states. Its power to try impeachments would seem to offer little occa-
sion for state influence. During the impeachment of Samuel Chase,
none of the states instructed their senators, apparently on the theory
that instructions to the Senate as a court of impeachment were im-
proper.382 The states did react, however, to the acquittal of Chase and
moved to obtain the power of recall out of a sense of betrayal by the
Senate.383
Such noninterference, in fact, has not always been the case. In
the impeachment of President Andrew Johnson, some states in-
structed their senators to vote to convict. A number of Republicans
ignored their instructions, and one, John Henderson of Missouri, of-
fered to resign rather than vote to convict. He then refused to resign
and voted not guilty.38 4 While the Seventeenth Amendment has re-
lieved state legislatures of the temptation to influence impeachments,
this is surely not a power essential to protecting state interests.
378 ELviNS & McKrrcCK, supra note 138, at 417; see also supra notes 137-45 and accompany-
ing text.
379 NCSL Resolution Backs GATT Pact if States' Authority Is Protected, 11 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) No. 31, at 1200 (Aug. 3, 1994).
380 Aides to Governors' Group Offer Plan to Balance State-Federal Relations, Daily Report for
Executives (BNA), at A245 (Dec. 23, 1994).
381 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
382 Colgrove, supra note 98, at X-47. But see Kramer, supra note 96, at 1568 n.53 (suggesting
that states did issue instructions to impeach Chase).
383 Riker, supra note 5, at 457-58; see supra note 190 and accompanying text.
384 2 G. HAYNEs, SnNATE OF THm UNrrED STATES, supra note 169, at 1034 n.4; LucE, supra
note 99, at 473-75.
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4. The Article V Amendment Process. -The unique relationship
of the Senate to the amendment process provides more fruitful
ground for exploring the consequences of the Seventeenth Amend-
ment. Article V provides two means for amendment. Congress, upon
the approval of two-thirds of both Houses, may propose amendments
to the states. If ratified by three-quarters of state legislatures or by
state conventions, the amendment becomes effective.3 85 Alterna-
tively, if two-thirds of the states call for a constitutional convention,
then Congress shall call a convention for proposing amendments. 386
As with the congressionally-initiated method, amendments proposed
by the convention become law upon ratification by three-fourths of
the states.
The two methods provide alternate paths for amending the Con-
stitution.387 The Founders assumed, and the assumption has been
borne out in practice, that it would be easier to initiate amendments
through Congress than through a constitutional convention. Although
the constitutional convention route is more cumbersome,388 fraught
with unanswered concerns over the scope of the convention's
agenda, 38 9 it is an important alternative because it allows the states to
amend the Constitution without the consent of Congress. 390 Congress
need only perform its duty and call the convention when sufficient
states have so applied.391
The Senate bears no express role in the amendment process. As
a chamber of Congress, the Senate may initiate the amendment pro-
cess within Congress by proposing amendments or suggesting that suf-
ficient states have applied for a convention. It may also prevent
Congress from proposing amendments-as it did for several years
385 U.S. CONST. art. V.
386 Id.; see also TmE FEDERAUST No. 85, at 593 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961); THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 257 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
387 See Paulsen, supra note 292, at 692 n.48.
388 "Even with [the constitution convention method], many framers recognized amendment
without Congressional agreement to be a difficult procedure." Amar, supra note 268,'at 1120.
389 As Gerald Gunther has said, "there are many questions, many uncertainties, and no au-
thoritative answers ... [;] neither I nor anyone else can make absolutely confident assertions
about what the convention process was intended to look like." Gerald Gunther, Constitutional
Brinkmanship: Stumbling Toward a Convention, 65 A.B.A. J. 1046, 1049 (1979); see, e.g., Charles
Black, Jr., Amending the Constitution. A Letter to a Congressman, 82 YALE LJ. 189 (1972);
Walter Dellinger, The Recurring Question of the "Limited" Constitutional Convention, 88 YALE
L.J. 1623 (1979); John Noonan, The Convention Method of Constitutional Amendment-Its
Meaning, Usefulness, and Wisdom, 10 PAC. L.J. 641 (1979); Paulsen, supra note 292; Grover
Rees, Constitutional Conventions and Constitutional Arguments: Some Thoughts About Limits, 6
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 79 (1982); William Van Alstyne, The Limited Constitutional Conven-
tion-The Recurring Answer, 1979 DuKE L.J. 985.
390 Tim FEDERALIST No. 39, at 257 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961); THE FEDER-
ALIST No. 43, at 296 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
391 Paulsen, supra note 292, at 756-57.
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prior to the proposing of the Seventeenth Amendment-by refusing
to agree with the House. In this respect, the Senate's formal responsi-
bilities are no different from those of the House of Representatives.
It is an integral part of alternative processes, one initiated by the na-
tional legislature, and the other by state legislatures.
The position of senators as the representatives of the states nev-
ertheless marks a unique role for the Senate in the proposal and pas-
sage of amendments. Because of the practice of instruction, there is a
middle road between congressionally-proposed amendments and con-
stitutional conventions. Because of our hesitation to call a constitu-
tional convention, we have left Congress responsible for initiating
constitutional reforms of its own institutions; a task it, quite naturally,
has accepted with reluctance.302
From the beginning, state legislatures instructed their senators to
propose or support constitutional amendments. States instructed their
senators to procure a Bill of Rights,393 and amendments depriving fed-
eral courts of jurisdiction over suits by private individuals against
states (now the Eleventh Amendment), 394 changing the mode of elect-
ing the President and Vice-President (now the Twelfth Amend-
ment),395 the removal of Article III judges,396 the removal of senators
392 Professors Ackerman and Golove point to the "dysfunctional" rules laid down by Article
V when reforms affect the Congress. Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitu-
tional?, 108 HARV. L. RaV. 804, 909 (1995) (stating that in the 1940s "while a strong and sus-
tained majority of Americans opposed the Senate monopoly on treaty-making, Article V was
blithely instructing them to seek the consent of two thirds of the Senate to its own
disestablishment").
393 Colgrove, supra note 98, at X-1, 2.
394 U.S. CONST. amend. XI; see New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 88 (1883) (instruc-
tions from Massachusetts to procure constitutional amendment in light of Chisholm v. Georgia, 2
U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793)); Florida v. Georgia, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 478, 519-20 (1854) (same; in-
structions of Virginia); see also Clyde E. Jacobs, Prelude to Amendment: The States Before the
Court, 12 AM. J. LEGAL HxsT. 19, 31, 34 (1968) (discussing the instructions).
Various other states reacted sympathetically to the Massachusetts and Virginia resolutions.
"[D]uring the fall and winter of 1793, virtually every state governor referred to Chisholm and the
Massachusetts and Virginia resolutions in messages to their respective legislatures. The legisla-
tures of North Carolina and Connecticut formally responded with resolutions critical of the
Court's decision." New Hampshire, New York, Maryland, South Carolina, and Georgia also
considered resolutions, although they did not formally adopt such. The resolution which became
the Eleventh Amendment was introduced in the Senate on January 2, 1794. CLYDE E. JACOBS,
THE ELEvENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 65 (1972).
395 ANNALS OF CONG., 8th Cong., 1st Sess. 95-96 (1803) (instructions of Vermont and Massa-
chusetts); ANNALS OF CONo., 7th Cong., 1st Sess. 472 (1802) (instructions of Vermont); id. at 509
(instructions of New York); id. at 1285 (same); see also TADArISA KURODA, THE OIos OF
Tm TWELFtH AMENDMEN-r. TmE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1787-1804, at
109 (1994) (resolutions and amendments proposed by New Hampshire, Vermont, and South
Carolina).
396 SENATE JOURNAL, 10th Cong., 1st Sess. 271 (1808) (instructions of Massachusetts legisla-
ture); see also id. at 27, 131-32 (instructions of Vermont legislature).
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by state legislatures, 397 and the direct election of senators (now the
Seventeenth Amendment).3 98
The leverage states held over senators and the amendment pro-
cess did not go unnoticed in the Senate. During debates over a propo-
sal to amend the manner of electing the President and the Vice-
President, Senator William Plumer of New Hampshire argued that
whatever the merits of instructions on other matters of interest to the
Senate, the states exceeded their powers under Article V when they
instructed on proposed amendments:
The State Legislatures have nothing to do till after Congress has pro-
posed the amendments, and then it is their exclusive province either to
ratify or reject them. But they have no authority to direct or even re-
quest Congress to propose particular amendments for themselves to rat-
ify. Instructions on this subject are therefore improper. It is an
assumption of power, not the exercise of a right. It is an attempt to
create an undue influence over Congress. It is prejudging the question
before it is proposed by the only authority that has the Constitutional
right to move it. If these instructions are obligatory, our votes must be
governed not by the convictions of our own judgments, or the propriety
and fitness of the measure, but by the mandates of other Legislatures.
This would destroy one of the checks that the Constitution has provided
against innovation. State Legislatures may, on some subjects, instruct
their Senators; but on this, their instructions ought not to influence,
much less bind us, to propose amendments, unless we ourselves deem
them necessary.399
Senator Tracy opined that Article V contemplated the "uninfluenced
movement" of senators and representatives.4 00 "Can it be thought...
either proper or Constitutional for the State Legislatures to assume
the power of instructing to propose to them a measure when the
power is not only not given to them but given exclusively to Congress?
As well and with as much propriety might Congress make a law at-
tempting to bind the State Legislatures to ratify, as the Legislatures,
by instructions, bind Congress to propose. '40 1
397 Id. at 267 (1808) (instructions of Virginia).
398 See supra note 172.
399 ANNALS OF CONG., 8th Cong., 1st Sess. 153-54 (1803); see 46 CONG. REc. 2769 (1911)
(statement of Sen. Heyburn) ("[T]he States have not asked us to submit the question [of direct
election of senators], nor does the Constitution authorize them to request Congress to submit it.
There is no mention in the Constitution with reference to the States requesting Congress to
submit amendments to the Constitution."); see also id. at 2773 ("There is not a line in the Consti-
tution... that authorizes the legislatures of the States to demand ... that [the Senate] act in a
given way."). The irony of Senator Heyburn's remarks is that Heyburn disparaged the right of
legislatures to instruct because he was defending their right to elect. Heyburn was acting con-
trary to his own instructions from Idaho. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
400 ANNALS OF CONG., 8th Cong., 1st Sess. 176 (1803).
401 Id. at 177.
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The senators' arguments turned on the absence of an express role
for the states in the proposing of amendments in Congress. But the
relationship between the states and the Senate was created by Article
I, Section 4, not by Article V. No single state could dictate a course of
action to the Senate, only a course of action to its own senators.
Nothing in Article V forbid the states from influencing Congress-
whether through instructions or through some other means.
In sum, the Seventeenth Amendment affected Article V directly,
but not formally. It took from the states a means of defending them-
selves against unwise amendments, and it severely limited the power
of the states to amend the Constitution without a state call for a con-
vention. It has thus made constitutional conventions more likely since
states cannot instruct senators to propose and support amendments.
Just as instruction by the people "displace[d] representation in ordi-
nary government with direct action of the People themselves, '40 2 so
instruction of senators displaced the senators with the direct action of
state governments themselves, but in a manner that fell short of con-
stitutional convention. A subtle, but important change.
V. CONCLUSION
For its defenders, the Seventeenth Amendment was the "wildest
and widest revolution.., since the Constitution of the United States
was adopted in 1787. ' '403 To its detractors, it was "the total product of
those who believed in the illusion of reform.1404 In some respects, the
Seventeenth Amendment represents both a significant change in the
structure of the Constitution and a failed reform of a system gone
awry. Far from "bringing the process of government close to the lay
voter," the Seventeenth Amendment "may well have insulated the
voter even further from his government. 40 -5 In the end, the Amend-
ment may have served neither the purposes of federalism nor the ide-
als of democracy.
In New York v. United States, Justice O'Connor observed:
The Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States for the bene-
fit of the States or state governments as abstract political entities, or
even for the benefit of the public officials governing the States. To the
contrary, the Constitution divides authority between federal and state
governments for the protection of individuals. 406
If the Seventeenth Amendment represented the failure of state legis-
latures, did the people acquire anything in the exchange? At one
402 Akhil R. Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55
U. CQ. L. REv. 1043, 1059 (1988).
403 35 CoNo. REQ 3981 (1902) (statement of Sen. DePew).
404 Daynes, Direct Election, supra note 34, at iv.
405 Id. at 150.
406 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992).
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level, they gained unmediated control over their senators. At least
they acquired "control" in the sense of electing a senator every six
years. There is, unfortunately, no mechanism for the people to exer-
cise any direct control over their senators in the interim. To put it
another way, there is no means for senators to give an accounting of
themselves-other than through the mechanism of an election. That
would seem to suggest that we have less control of senators than pre-
viously. The Seventeenth Amendment answered the people's craving
for the reins of democracy, but at the level at which senators operate,
democracy is a poor master.
During the debates over the Seventeenth Amendment, one rep-
resentative asked, "to whom [is] a Senator ... responsible? Is he re-
sponsible to the Legislature that elected him? ... [T]o whom is he
responsible after it expires?" 40 7 Another argued that "the constant
shifting of the membership of State Legislatures removes any possibil-
ity of accountability to the body which elects. ' 408 But what was the
alternative? Were the people a more stable body and better posi-
tioned to demand accountability? The people only appeared to be
more stable because they were more faceless than the legislature; it
was precisely because the people could not be identified that senators
felt beholden to the people as a body. It is easy to say that one is
answerable to the people when the people have no effective means of
calling their representatives to accountability.
It is unclear that the Supreme Court should be responsible for
guaranteeing the role of the states and protecting the people from
themselves. The Seventeenth Amendment took the power to elect
senators from state legislatures (which, after all, represent people) and
gave it to the people (who would now represent themselves). It seems
to me that states as political entities in a federal system were more
aggressively represented in Congress through their legislatures, but
since the Constitution now provides otherwise, the people cannot
complain about the Court when the people demanded control of the
Senate and then failed to exercise it with the same vigilance as their
legislatures.
If we are genuinely interested in federalism as a check on the
excesses of the national government and therefore, as a means of pro-
tecting individuals, we should consider repealing the Seventeenth
407 23 CONG. REC. 6064 (1892) (statement of Rep. Tucker).
408 Id. at 6079 (statement of Rep. Scott); see 32 CONo. RE-c. 2125 (1899) (statement of Sen.
Pettigrew) ("If I should undertake to follow the change of sentiment reflected by the successive
legislatures of South Dakota, I would find myself voting on all sides of almost every question. I
observe further that the members of the various legislatures of South Dakota have almost always
been so unfortunate as not to secure reelection at the hands of their constituents."). See also 32
CONG. REc. 839-40 (1899) (statement of Sen. White, explaining why, as a Democrat, he would
not follow instructions from a Republican legislature).
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Amendment, limiting the terms senators serve (irrespective of
whether we also impose term limits on our Representatives), and giv-
ing state legislatures the power to recall their senators. Reestablishing
the position of state legislatures, together with recall authority, would
effectively return the practice of instruction and engage state legisla-
tures as a serious and proximate check on Congress. Limited terms
would encourage the kind of natural ambition among state legislators
that would command their attention to national affairs, while the flow
of state legislators (or other state officials) to the Senate-with the
foreknowledge that they would be returning to the state as citizens-
would reinforce the interests of the state.
The Senate's slide to popular democracy unyoked states and the
national government in a way that has left the states nearly powerless
to defend their position as other legitimate representatives of the peo-
ple. As the United States moved into the Twentieth Century, it was
inevitable that Congress would aggressively exercise power over mat-
ters such as commerce and spending for the general welfare in ways
that no constitutional prophet would have foreseen. The lack of fore-
sight of the circumstances under which Congress would exercise its
powers did not excuse our failure to maintain those constitutional
structures that assure the tempered, essential use of such powers.
When we loosed ourselves from the mast to answer the Sirens' call, we
unleashed consequences only Circe could have foreseen.
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APPENDIX
Data Supporting Figure 1
Year Party
1865 Dem
Rep
1867 Dem
Rep
1869 Dem
Rep
1871 Dem
Rep
1873 Dem
Rep
1875 Dem
Rep
1877 Dem
Rep
1879 Dem
Rep
1881 Dem
Rep
1883 Dem
Rep
1885 Dem
Rep
1887 Dem
Rep
1889 Dem
Rep
1891 Dem
Rep
1893 Dem
Rep
1895 Dem
Rep
1897 Dem
Rep
1899 Dem
Rep
1901 Dem
Rep
1903 Dem
Rep
1905 Dem
Rep
1907 Dem
Rep
1909 Dem
Rep
1911 Dem
Rep
1913 Dem
Rep
1915 Dem
Rep
1917 Dem
Rep
1919 Dem
Rep
1921 Dem
Rep
1923 Dem
Rep
Senate Senate w/
Summary Change
570
Class 1
0
0
0
0
5
20
0
0
0
0
13
10
0
0
0
0
9
16
0
0
0
0
12
13
0
0
0
0
15
13
0
0
0
0
8
20
0
0
0
0
6
24
0
0
0
0
16
16
0
0
0
0
16
16
0
0
0
0
21
11
Class 2
3
12
0
0
0
0
8
16
0
0
0
0
14
11
0
0
0
0
13
13
0
0
0
0
13
16
0
0
0
0
10
18
0
0
0
0
14
15
0
0
0
0
12
19
0
0
0
0
20
12
0
0
0
0
15
17
0
0
0
0
Class 3
0
0
2
17
0
0
0
0
5
17
0
0
0
0
13
12
0
0
0
0
12
13
0
0
0
0
15
12
0
0
0
0
10
0
0
0
0
12
18
0
0
0
0
14
17
0
0
0
0
18
14
0
0
0
0
7
25
0
0
Change
3
12
3
16
5
20
8
16
5
17
13
10
14
11
13
12
9
16
13
13
12
13
12
13
13
16
15
12
14
14
10
18
10
18
8
20
12
17
12
18
6
24
12
19
14
17
17
15
18
14
13
19
12
20
12
20
9
23
12
20
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Year
1925
1927
1929
1931
1933
1935
1937
1939
1941
1943
1945
1947
1949
1951
1953
1955
1957
1959
1961
1963
1965
1967
1969
1971
1973
1975
1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
Party
Dem
Rep
Dem
Rep
Dem
Rep
Dem
Rep
Dem
Rep
Dem
Rep
Dem
Rep
Dem
Rep
Dem
Rep
Dem
Rep
Dem
Rep
Dem
Rep
Dem
Rep
Dem
Rep
Dem
Rep
Dem
Rep
Dem
Rep
Dem
Rep
Dem
Rep
Dem
Rep
Dem
Rep
Dem
Rep
Dem
Rep
Dem
Rep
Dem
Rep
Dem
Rep
Dem
Rep
Dem
Rep
Dem
Rep
Dem
Rep
Dem
Rep
Dem
Rep
Class 1
0
0
0
0
13
19
0
0
0
0
24
7
0
0
0
0
20
11
0
0
0
0
11
21
0
0
0
0
13
19
0
0
0
0
25
8
0
0
0
0
26
7
0
0
0
0
22
11
0
0
0
0
22
11
0
0
0
0
19
14
0
0
0
0
Class 2
14
18
0
0
0
0
20
12
0
0
0
0
24
7
0
0
0
0
15
17
0
0
0
0
23
9
0
0
0
0
22
10
0
0
0
0
20
13
0
0
0
0
15
18
0
0
0
0
16
17
0
0
0
0
14
19
0
0
0
0
16
17
0
0
Class 3
0
0
13
19
0
0
0
0
27
5
0
0
0
0
22
10
0
0
0
0
21
11
0
0
0
0
15
17
0
0
0
0
17
15
0
0
0
0
23
11
0
0
0
0
18
16
0
0
0
0
22
12
0
0
0
0
13
20
0
0
0
0
20
14
Change
13
19
12
20
7
25
13
19
24
8
20
11
24
7
19
13
15
16
15
17
14
18
10
22
19
13
13
19
10
22
18
14
17
15
25
8
23
10
18
16
27
6
18
15
15
19
21
12
21
12
28
6
29
4
24
9
20
13
25
8
25
8
24
10
Senate
Summary
42
54
48
48
40
56
46
50
60
36
71
24
75
19
70
24
66
28
57
38
56
39
47
49
55
41
49
47
51
45
50
46
52
44
64
33
62
36
68
32
69
31
64
36
59
41
55
45
56
44
60
40
60
40
58
42
49
50
46
53
48
51
55
45
Senate w/
Change
34
62
37
59
32
64
32
64
44
52
57
38
68
26
63
31
58
36
49
46
44
51
39
57
43
53
42
54
42
54
41
55
45
51
60
37
65
33
66
34
68
32
63
37
60
40
54
46
57
43
70
30
78
22
81
19
73
26
69
30
70
29
74
26
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Senate Senate w/
Year Party Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Change Summary Change
1989 Dem 19 0 0 25 55 74
Rep 14 0 0 8 45 26
1991 Dem 0 17 0 26 56 75
Rep 0 16 0 7 44 25
1993 Dem 0 0 19 25 55 76
Rep 0 0 15 9 45 24
1995 Dem 14 0 0 19 50 70
Rep 19 0 0 14 50 30
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